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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a water right curtailment order issued by the Director of the Idaho 
Depaitment of Water Resources ("JDWR"). The order stops farmers, cities, and businesses from 
pumping groundwater from the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer ("ESPA") so that more groundwater 
will overflow from the ESPA into the Snake River. The beneficiaries of the order are seven irri-
gation entities known collectively as the Surface Water Coalition ("SWC") who divert water out 
of the Snake River at various points between American Falls Reservoir and Milner Dam (near 
Burley). 
The district court reversed the Director's order concerning "material injury'' to Twin Falls 
Canal Company ("TFCC") on the basis that the Director utilized a "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard of proof instead of a "clear and convincing" standard, Idaho Ground Water Ap-
propriators, Inc. ("JGWA") asks this Court to sustain the Director's decision because material 
injury should be determined based on the preponderance of the evidence standard that normally 
applies to agency decisions. 
IGWA also asks this Court to reject the SWC appeal concerning the "minimum full 
supply" methodology because the issue is moot. Even if this Court considers the issue, the SWC 
argument should be rejected because it is predicated on the false premise that depletion to the 
water supply automatically equates to material injury. 
GROUNDWATER USERS' OPENING BRIEF 7 
2. Procedural History. 
On January 14, 2005, the SWC petitioned the Director to curtail groundwater diversions 
from the ESP.A. (R. Vol. I, p. 1.)1 The Director responded with an Order dated February l 5, 
2005 ("Fehrua1:}1 2005 Order") that initiated a contested case. (R. Vol. 2, p. 197.) The Director 
then issued an Order dated April 19, 2005 ("April 2005 Order") concluding that the SWC had 
suffered "material injury" due to groundwater pumping, and requiring groundwater users to pro-
vide 27,700 acre-feet of replacement water to the SWC to mitigate the injury, or suffer cunail-
ment. (R. Vol. 7, pp. 1157-1219.) On May 2, 2005, the Director issued an Amended Order ("May 
2005 Order") that revised certain findings in the April 2005 Order but still required groundwater 
users to provide 27,700 acre-feet of mitigation water to the SWC. (R. Vol. 8, pp. 1359-1424.) 
These orders are referred to collectively herein as the "2005 Curtailment Order." 
Several parties obj~cted to the 2005 Curtailment Order and requested a hearing, includ-
ing JGWA, Idaho Dairymen's Association ("Dairymen"), City of Pocatello ("Pocatello"), Bureau 
of Reclamation ("Bureau"), State Agency Ground Water Users ("State Users"), and SWC. How-
ever, the SWC preempted the hearing by filing suit in district court to have the IDWR's Rulesf(Jr 
Conjunctive Management of Swface and Ground Water Resources ("CM Rules"), IDAPA 
37.03.11, declared facially unconstituiional. American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. 
<~l Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862 (2007) ("AFRD2"). After that proved unsuccessful, the Di-
rector appointed former Chief Justice Gerald F. Schroeder to preside as hearing officer, and a 
hearing was held over three weeks in January and February of 2008. 
1 Citations to the agency record are identified by ''R. Vol.'' Citations to the clerk's record on appeal are identified by 
''Clerk's R. Vol." 
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The hearing officer issued an Opinion Constituting Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law 
and Recommendation ("Recommended Order") on April 29, 2008. (R. Vol. 37. p. 7048.) The 
Director subsequently issued a Final Order Regarding the Surface Water Coalition Delivery Call 
(''Final Order") on September 5, 2008. (R. Vol. 39, p. 7381.) The Final Order adopts the find-
mgs and conclusions contained in the Recommended Order and the prior orders of the Director 
except as specifically modified by the Final Order. Id. at 7382. 
The SWC and the Bureau filed petitions for judicial review of the Final Order, and the 
Dairymen filed a cross-petition for judicial review. (R. Vol. 39. pp. 7450 and 7406.) The peti-
tions were assigned to the Honorable John M. Melanson, District Judge of the Fifth Judicial Dis-
trict. (Clerk's R. Vol. 1, p. 19.) Judge Melanson issued an Order on Petition.for .Judicial Review 
on July 24, 2009 (Clerk's R. Vol. 3, p.511) and an Amended Order on Petitions.for Rehearing: 
Order Denying Surface Water Coalition's Motion for Clarification on September 9, 2009 
(Clerk's R. Vol. 7, p. 1240.) The district court orders have been appealed to this Court by IGWA, 
the S\VC, and Pocatello. 
The Director stated in the Final Order that he was in the process of developing an im-
proved methodology for determining material injury. (R. Vol. 39, p. 7386.) He subsequently is-
sued a series of orders, beginning with the Final Order Regarding Methodology.for Determining 
~Material Injury to Reasonable In-Season Demand and Reasonable Carryover ( "Methodolot,ry 
Order") on April 7, 2010 (Clerk's R. Voi. 7, p. 1354(s)) and culminating, after a hearing, with 
the Second Amended Final Order Regarding Methodology for Determining Material Injury to 
Reasonable In-Season Demand and Reasonable Carryover ("Amended Afethodology Order") on 
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June 23, 20 I 0. Methodology Order is included in this record; the Amended 1\!fethodologv 
Order is not The Amended Jvfethodology Order is currently on appeal to the Twin Falls County 
District Court, case no. CV-2010-5520 (consolidated with Gooding County Case No. CV-2010-
382). 
3. Standard of Review. 
This appeal is taken from the district court, but the subject of review is the Final Order 
issued by the Director. When reviewing decisions, this Court generally reviews the agen-
cy record independent of the district court decision. First Interstate Bank, NA. v. West, 107 Ida-
ho 851, 852-53 (1984). The Final Order is to be reviewed under the Idaho Administrative Pro-
cedures Act. Idaho Code§ 42-1701A(4). It must be affirmed unless the Court finds that the find-
in gs, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the Director are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or, 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). Even if the Director erred in one of the foregoing manners, the Final 
Order should be affinned if no substantial rights of the SWC were prejudiced. Id. 
The Court's review of issues of disputed fact must be confined to the record, and the 
Co mt should not substitute its judgment for that of the Director as to the weight of the evidence 
on issues of fact. Idaho Code §§ 67-5277 and 67-5279(1 ). If the evidence in the record is con-
flicting, the Court must sustain the Final Order so long as it is based on substantial evidence in 
the record. Barron v. IDWR, 135 Idaho 414, 417 (2001). 
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With respect to discretionary matters, courts defer to the agency decision unless the agen-
cy "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.'' Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Va!-
iey, 145 Idaho 87, 88 (2007). The agency decision should be affirmed if the agency "perceived 
the issue in question as discretionary, acted within the outer limits of its discretion and consis-
tently with the legal standards applicable to the available choices, and reached its own decision 
through an exercise of reason." Haw v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 143 Idaho 51, 54 (2006). 
If the Final Order is not affirmed, it should be set aside in whole or in part, and remanded 
for further proceedings as necessary. Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3). 
4. Statement of Facts. 
A. SWC water rights. 
The SWC entities all operate canal systems that divert water from the Snake River near 
Burley, Idaho. Their water rights have priority dates ranging from 1900 to 1939. (R. Vol. 1 p. 8: 
Exs. 4001A and 4001.) They also have contracts with the Bureau to use water that is stored in 
Jackson Lake, Palisades Reservoir, American Falls Reservoir, and Lake Walcott. (R. Vol. 37, pp. 
7055, 7060-61; Ex. 9704.) These reservoirs capture water during the winter and spring that can 
then released during the summer for irrigation. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1372.) Water is stored in the reser-
voirs under water rights owned by the Bureau with priority dates ranging from 1906 to 1957. 
(Exs. 4001A and 4000.) Neither the SWC's nor the Bureau's water rights have been decreed in 
the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") because they are subject to unresolved objec-
tions. (R. Exs. 4615, 9723-9729.) 
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Like all water rights, the SWC water rights define the maximum amount of water that 
may be diverted under the right. (R. Vol. 37, pp. 7073-75.) The amount actually needed for irri-
gation can be substantially less. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1378.) One reason is because farmland is often 
paved over, turned into a residential or commercial development, or otherwise removed from 
irrigation. (Exs. 4300, 4310, 4339-4352, 357.) At least 6,600 acres claimed by TFCC are 
not irrigated due to development (Ex. 8190 at 14; Tr. Vol. 11, p. 2247), 2,907 are non-irrigated in 
Burley Irrigation District (Ex. 4300 at 1 O; 4301 ), and 5,008 are non-irrigated in Minidoka 
Irrigation District (Ex. 4302.) Another reason is that essentially all irrigation in southern Idaho is 
now done by sprinkler, which requires less water per acre than the flood irrigation practices used 
historically. (R. Vol. 4, pp. 621-22; R. Vol. 8, p. 1378; R. Vol. 1 p. 2149; R. Vol. 28, p. 5305.) 
The disparity between the maximum authorized rate of diversion shown on the face of a 
water right and the amount of water actually needed for beneficial use is illustrated by comparing 
the amount of water authorized for diversion under the SWC's water rights with the amount of 
water it actually diverts when there was no scarcity of water. The SW C's natural flow rights col-
lectively authorize the diversion of 13,756 cfs, or 6.7 million acre-feet, each irrigation season. 
(R. VoL 8, pp. 1370-72.)2 Their storage water rights collectively authorize the diversion of up to 
2.3 million acre-feet, for a combined total of 9 million acre-feet. (R. Vol. 8, pp. 1373-74.) Yet, 
the maximum amount of water the SWC has ever actually diverted is just over 4 million acre-
feet. 8000 at Vol. 4, p. AS-8.) 
2 The irrigation season for the SWC water rights is March 15 to November I 5 (246 days). (Ex. 400 J A at The 
diversion of one cfs equals 1.9835 acre-feet per day. Over a 246-day irrigation season. the SWC's natural flow rights 
allow the diversion of up to 6, 7 J 2, J J 6 acre-feet ( J. 9835 x 13,756 cfs x 246 days). 
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The S WC's storage water rights are intended to provide a measure of insurance against 
drought. (Ex. 1023 at 6-8; Ex. 3048 at 21; R. Vol. 2, p. 207.) Jt was never expected, however, 
that storage water would insulate the SWC from the effects of drought. Even with the construc-
tion of Palisades Reservoir (the last storage facility lo be constructed, primarily for drought re-
lief) the Bureau anticipated that the SWC and other spaceholders would occasionally sutfor wa-
ter shortages. (Ex. 7001 at 11-16.) 
B. The Snake River and the ESP A. 
The ESPA and the Snake River are hydraulical ly connected at various locations and in 
varying degrees. (R. Vol. 8, pp. 1363-64; Ex. 4 100 at 5-6.) ln some places groundwater flows 
from the ESPA intc the Snake River; in other places the opposite occurs. Id. 
The key connection in th.is case is in the Blackfoot to Neeley reach of the Snake River, 
which runs from Blackfoot to just south of Massacre Rocks near American Falls, Idaho. (R. Vo!. 
3, p. 542.) In this reach there are numerous springs that discharge groundwater from the ESPA 
into the River. (Ex. 8013.) Since the SWC canals are all located downstream from this reach, 
they filed their delivery call with the Director in 2005 asking him to shut down groundwater 
pumping so that more water will overfiow from the ESPA into this reach of the Snake River. (R. 
Vol. l, pp. 2-4.) 
The impact of groundwater pumping on the Blackfoot to Neeley reach was vigorously 
contested at the hearing. Exhibits 4113 shows no statistically significant trend in reach gains over 
the 93 year period of measurement for this reach. Significantly, the large expansion of ground-
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water pumping in the 1960s and 1970s does not correlate with any decline in reach gains, indi-
cating that groundwater pumping has little impact on this reach of the River. (Ex. 4100 at 7.) 
It is also significant that groundwater, unlike surface water, cannot be directed through 
physical channels from a junior user's point of diversion to a senior's point of diversion. (R. Vol. 
37, p. 7050.) Given the varying degrees of connectivity between the ESPA and the Snake River, 
shutting off a well does not always mean that a usable quantity of water will accrue to the senior. 
(R. Vol. 3, p. 556.) Even when curtailment will increase surface water flows. typically only a 
portion of the curtailed water will accrue to the target reach of the River. This is because when 
groundwater is pumped from an aquifer there results a "cone of depression" in the groundwater 
table that has a radial impact on the aquifer (i.e. the impact emanates 360 degrees). (R. Vol. 8, p. 
1364.) When pumping ceases, the recovery to the aquifer is likewise radial. Jd. When a well is 
;;hut off, the impact is dissipated across the aquifer, with only a portion accruing to the target 
reach of the River. (R. Vol. 2, p. 199.) The rest is effectively lost from beneficial use. The degree 
of loss is exacerbated by distance--the further away a well is from the Snake River, the less im-
pact it has on River flows, and the greater the loss of beneficial us~. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1364.) In addi-
tion, the effects of groundwater curtailment are spread throughout the year, which means that the 
effects of curtailment may be largely realized during the non-irrigation season when the SWC 
cannot use the water anyway. 
C. Drought. 
The worst drought on record in ldaho occurred from 2000 to 2005. (Tr. Vol.3, p. 625.) it 
was so severe that it is expected to be repeated no more than once every 500 years. (Id.; Exs. 
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4105 and 4106.) It caused a reduction in "reach gains" to the Snake River between Blackfoot and 
Neeley (dmvnstream from American Falls). Before this drought, there had been no statistically 
significant change in reach gains for this reach. (Ex. 4113; R. Vol. Vol. 3. pp. 546, 553; R Vol. 
27, p. 5090; Exs. 4145-49.) 
D. The curtailment order. 
In response to the SWC delivery call, the Director ordered groundwater users to provide 
the SWC with enough water to meet their irrigation needs, or suffer curtailment. (R. Vol. 9, pp. 
1559-1560 and 1569.) The Director determined what their irrigation needs would be by develop-
ing what he termed their "minimum foll supply." (R. Vol. 8, pp. 1383-84.) The Director subse-
quently adopted a more sophisticated methodology for determining irrigation needs, termed "rea-
sonable in-season demand." (Clerk's R. Vol. 7, pp. 1354(s)-1354(iii).) Under both methodolo-
gies, the extent of curtailment and mitigation is recalculated annually and adjusted throughout 
the year to account for water conditions. 
E. Mitigation. 
The SWC Opening Brief states that "a lack of mitigation water provided no relief to the 
injured Coalition members while junior groundwater users continued to pump without con-
straint." (SWC Open. Br. 12.) The implication is that groundwater users provided no mitigation. 
and the SWC was left without water to meet its irrigation needs. This is simply untrue. 
Groundwater users have not actually been curtailed because they have at great effort and 
expense delivered to the SWC the full amount of mitigation water required by every order of the 
Director, fully offsetting any material injury. In 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010, IGWA rented sto-
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rage water from other spaceholders in the upper Snake River reservoir system to fully mitigate 
TFCC's predicted material injury (Exs. 4501, 4502A at 10, 4603; R. Vol. 34, p. 6431.) (No miti-
gation was required in 2006, 2008, or 2011 due to adequate water supplies.) 
The SWC also gives the rnisimpression that ICrWA failed to provide storage water miti-
gation in a timely manner, claiming that "the Director's administration produced no mitigation 
water for the Coalition during the irrigation season even though the Director found material in-
jwy" (SWC Open. Br. 11, emphasis in original.) This allegation simply ignores how the Water 
District 0 l accounts for the use of storage water. Because Water District 0 I completes its ac-
counting for the use of storage water following the irrigation season, water leased by IGWA for 
mitigation has at times been transferred into the SWC's 
tion season. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 826; R. Vol. 38, p. 7208.) 
F. Impact to the SWC. 
water accounts after the irriga-
The SWC often claims dire harm as a result of groundwater pumping, yet it has failed to 
present any competent evidence that a single acre of farmland had gone without water. The SWC 
put on a number of lay witnesses who offered their personal opinion that they experienced re-
duced crop yields, but none could provide substantiating evidence (it should not have been diffi-
cult to provide documentation comparing crop yields between wet and dry years, if a disparity 
legitimately existed). (R. Vol. 34, pp. 6361-66; R. Vol. 33, pp. 6269-72; Vol. 33, pp. 6333-39; 
R. Vol. 40, pp. 7546-48; R. Vol. 33, pp. 6286-88; R. Vol. 33. pp. 6279-80; R. Vol. 33, pp. 6260-
62; R. Vol. 33, pp. 6342-44. ) The manager of the largest SWC entity testified that he had no 
evidence of crop loss either: 
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Q. There's no examples of fallowing based on water sho11age? 
A. No. 
Q. And no examples of fallowing you can point to based on -- I'm sorry -- crop loss 
that you can point to based on water shortage; correct? 
A. No. 
(Tr. Vol. 8, p. 1788.) Some of the SWC's lay witnesses testified that they had changed their 
cropping patterns, but they admitted that this was not necessarily a result of reduced water sup-
plies. North Side Canal Company's long-time manager testified that, if anything, more water-
consumptive crops like corn and hay had been planted in recent years due to the growth of the 
dairy industry in the area. (Tr. Vol. 9, pp. 1873-74, 1889-90.) 
In addition, the evidence showed that the SWC entities never had their storage water de-
liveries restricted despite record drought. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 713; Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 977-78.) Even in 
2004, the driest year of the drought, the SWC had 288,300 acre-feet of storage left at the end of 
the irrigation season. (Ex. 4100 at 14.) The Director predicted that TFCC and AFRD2 would suf-
fer material injury in both 2005 and 2007, yet still the SWC was able to meet its irrigation needs, 
with carryover remaining at the end of the irrigation season (R. Vol. 23, p. 4298). The SWC's 
contention that it was without water, or even without sufficient water to meet its irrigation needs, 
remains unsubstantiated. (R. Vol. 8, pp. 13 77-78.) 
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ISSUE ON APPEAL 
I. Did the Director act within his authority and discretion in determining that Twin 
falls Canal Company can meet its irrigation needs based on the "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard of proof? 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Conjunctive administration of surface and ground water requires the Director to make 
complex and difficult decisions concerning whether senior-priority water users are "suffering 
material injury and using water efficiently and without waste." CM Rule 42.0 l. /\.s this Court 
explained in AFRD2, t'1ese decisions "require some determination of 'reasonableness'" and 
"some exercise of discretion by the Director." 143 Idaho at 880. 
In applying the CM Rules in this case, the Director determined that Twin Falls Canal 
Company ("TFCC'") couid meet its irrigation needs with 518 inch of water per acre. The district 
court reversed that decision on the basis that the Director must use a heightened "clear and con-
vincing'' standard of proof as opposed to the "preponderance of the evidence" standard that typi-
cally applies to agency decisions. 
This Court should reverse the district court decision and uphold the preponderance of the 
evidence standard because (a) most civil suit decisions, like agency administrative decisions, are 
governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard, (b) the heightened clear and convincing 
standard applies in the water law arena only where water rights are permanently fixed or altered, 
which docs not happen as a result of a material injury determination, (c) courts in other jurisdic-
GROUNDWATER USERS' OPENING BRIEF 18 
tions distinguish between the adjudication of water rights and the distribution of water between 
established rights, and apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to administrative deci-
sions involving water distribution, (d) this Court's decision in AFRD2 supports using a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard of proof, ( e) the preponderance of the evidence standard affords 
presumptive weight to water right decrees, and (f) the cases relied on by the district cou11 do not 
define the standard of proof that should apply to the conjunctive administration of surface and 
ground water rights under the CM Rules. 
The SWC argument that the "minimum full supply" methodology is improper is moot 
because the Director has abandoned that methodology in favor of a new, more sophisticated me-
thodology called "reasonable in-season demand." Even if this Court considers the SWC's argu-
ment, it should be rejected because it is predicated on the false premise that depletion to the wa-
ter supply automatically equates to material injury. 
ARGUMENT 
When responding to a delivery call under the CM Rules, the Director has an obligation to 
determine whether the senior water user is "suffering material injury and using water efficiently 
and without waste." CM Rule 42.01. In this case, the Director determined that TFCC can meet its 
current irrigation needs with a "full headgate delivery" of 5/8 inch of water per acre (i.e . the 
SWC does not suffer material injury). (R. Vol. 8, p. 1378.) However, since the Director had rec-
ommended to the SR.BA court that TFCC's water right have a maximum permissible rate of di-
version of 3/4 inch per acre, the district court ruled that the Director has no authority to find that 
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s current irrigation needs can be met with less than 314 inch. (Clerk's R. VoL 3, p. 541.) 
On rehearing, the district court added that the Director erred by "failing to apply the correct pre-
sumptions and burden of proof in making the determination under the CM [Rules] that TFCC 
was entitled to less than the recommended quantity." (Clerk's R. Vol. 7, pp. I 247, I 249.) 
As set forth below, this Court should reverse the district court and uphold the Director's 
determination because he has clear authority under the CM Rules to determine whether TFCC 
can meet its irrigation needs with less than its maximum authorized rate of diversion, and the ap-
propri ate standard of proof for making that determination is "preponderance of the evidence." 
1. The Director has clear authority to determine whether TFCC can meet its irrigation 
needs with less than its maximum authorized rate of diversion. 
The first sentence of Idaho's water code proclaims that water is "essential to the industri-
al prosperity of this state, and all agricultural development throughout the greater portion of the 
state depend[s] upon its just apportionment to, and economical use by, those making a beneficial 
application of the same." Idaho Code § 42-10 I. Accordingly, this Court has for more than a cen-
tury held that "[e]conomy must be required and demanded in the use and application of water." 
Clear Springs v. 5packman, P.3d 7 l, 89 (201 I) (quoting Farmers· Co-op. Ditch Co. v. Ri-
no person can, by virtue of a prior appropriation, claim or hold more water than is 
necessary for the purpose of the appropriation, and the amount of water necessary 
for the purpose of irrigation of the lands in question and the condition of the land 
to be irrigated should be taken into consideration. A prior appropriator is only en-
titled to the water to the extent that he has use for it when economically and rea-
sonably used. It is the policy of the Jaw of this state to require the highest and 
possible duty from the waters of the state in the interest of agriculture and 
for useful and beneficial purposes. 
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u,·ashingfon State Sugar Co. v. Goodrich, 27 Idaho 26, 44 (1915) (internal cite omitted): see also. 
Clear Springs. 252 P.3d at 89 (quoting Poole v. Ofaveson, 82 Idaho 496, 502 ( 1960)) ("The poli-
cy of the law of this state is to secure the maximum use and benefit, and least wasteful use, of its 
water resources.") 
These rulings reflect the universal principle of western water law that beneficial use is the 
basis, measure, and limit of any water right. As stated in Idaho Code § 42-104, the appropriation 
of water ''must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his sue-
cessor in interest ceases lo use it for such purpose, the right ceases." See also. Lee v. Ha1J.ford 21 
Idaho 327, 330-3 l (1912) (holding that an appropriator is limited to the quantity of water he is 
able to apply to beneficial use at a particular time. within the I imit of his appropriation.) This 
Co!..lti confirmed this principle in its AFRD2 decision, explaining that the Director: 
has the duty and authority to consider circumstances when the water user is not ir-
rigating the full number of acres decreed under the water right. ff this Court were 
to rule the Director lacks the power in a delivery call to evaluate whether the se-
nior is putting the water to beneficial use, we would be ignoring the constitutional 
requirement that priority over water be extended only to those using the water. 
143 Idaho at 876. 
The foregoing principles are captured in CM Rule 42, which instructs the Director, when 
responding to a water delivery call, to determine whether the senior water user is "suffering ma-
terial injury and using water efficiently and witl1out waste." CM Rule 42.0J. The rule contains 
various factors the Director should consider when making this determination, including "[t]he 
amount of water being diverted and used compared to the water rights,'' CM Rule 42.0J .e, and 
"[tlhe extent to which the requirements of the holder of a senior-priority water right could be met 
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with the user's existing facilities and water supplies by employing reasonable diversion and con-
veyance efficiency and conservation practices ... ," CM Rule 42.0 J.g. These factors recognize 
that a water user may not always need the maximum amount of water under his water right lo 
accomplish his beneficial use. The example cited in AFRD2 of a farmer not irrigating the full 
number of acres is one such instance. Similarly, if a farmer converts from flood irrigarion co a 
much more efficient means of irrigation such as sprinkler or drip irrigation, he should be able to 
meet his irrigation needs with something less than the maximum rate of diversion. 
These material injury factors clearly aurhorize the Director to determine whether TfCC 
can meet its iITigation needs with less than the maximum authorized rate of diversion under its 
water right, and they were declared facially constitutional in AFRD2. I 43 Idaho at 876-77. 
2. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard should apply to the Director's de-
termination of material injury under CM Rule 42. 
Despite rhe Director's clear authority to determine material injury under CM Rule 42, and 
the substantial evidence supporting his 5/8 inch determination, the district court reversed the Di-
rector on the basis that "[t]he Hearing Officer's recommendation appears to be based on a deter-
rnination that TfCC's water right only entitles it to 5/8 inch per acre." (Clerk's R. Vol. !. p. 
541.) The district com1 concluded that this determination infringed on the authority of the SRBA 
court which is "vested with exclusive jurisdiction for determining the elements of a water right." 
ld. Jn other words, the district court ruled that the 5/8 inch determination was a re-adjudication of 
TFCC's water right. 
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On rehearing, the district court eiaborated on its decision, explaining that "[n]o reference 
was made [] to the evidentiary standard applied. Therefore, the Director erred by failing to apply 
the correct presumptions and burden of proof in making the determination under the CMR that 
TFCC was entitled to less than the recommended quantity." (Clerk's R. VoL 7, p. 1249.) The dis-
trict court acknowledged that the Director had authority to determine material injury under CM 
Rule 42, but concluded that such a determination must be based on the same "clear and convinc-
ing evidence'· standard that applies to water right adjudications. Id. at 1248-49. The district com1 
erroneously treated the Director's application of CM Rule 42 as an adjudicative act. 
The district court did not explain in detail the basis for its decision. but instead incorpo-
rated by reference a contemporary decision issued by Judge Wildman in a Minidoka County case 
that concludes that clear and convincing evidence is required to prove that material injury does 
not exist. Id. at 1247. Following the district court's ruling, Judge Wildman granted rehearing in 
the Minidoka County case and issued a subsequent order further explaining his decision. That 
rehearing decision, which is not a pai1 of the record in this case, is attached hereto as Appendix 
A. These decisions are referred to collectively in this brief as the "A&B Decision." 
This Court should reverse the district court decision and hold that administrative determi-
nations regarding material injury should be based on the preponderance of the evidence. There 
are reasons why a preponderance of the evidence standard should be used. First most 
civil suit decisions, like agency administrative decisions, are governed by a preponderance of the 
evidence standard. Second, the adjudication of water rights is different from the distribution of 
water among established rights. Third, courts in other jurisdictions distinguish between adjudica-
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tions and administration, and apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to administration. 
Fourth, this Court·s decision in AFRD2 supports using a preponderance of the standard 
of proof Fifth, the preponderance of the evidence standard affords presumptive weight to water 
right decrees. Finally, the cases relied on by the district court do not define the standard of proof 
that should apply to administrative decisions involving the distribution of water under the CM 
Rules. Each argument will be addressed in turn. 
A. The preponderance of the evidence standard generally applies in civil and 
administrative hearings. 
In most civil actions, "the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence, which 
means more probable than not" Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 622 ( 1991 ). "[T]he pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard [is] generally applied in administrative hearings.,. N. Fron-
tiers v. State ex re. Cade, 129 Idaho 437, 9 (Ct App. 1996) (citing 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administra-
tive Law§ 363 (1994)). 
In contrast, the "clear and convincing" standard is a heightened evidentiary standard that 
typically applies only to cases that involve permanent deprivations of rights such as the involun-
tary termination of parental rights (Idaho Code § 16-2009); involuntary institutional commitment 
(Idaho Code § 11 )); claims of professional misconduct of a lawyer (Idaho State Bar v. 
Top, I Idaho 414, 415 (1996)), or the permanent deprivation of real property (Cardenas v. 
Kurpjuweit, 116 Idaho 739, 742-43 (l 989)). 
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B. The adjudication of a water right is different from the distribution of water 
among established rights. 
In the water law arena. clear and convincing evidence is required when someone is seek-
ing to eliminate or permanently alter the defined elements of a water right: "One who seeks to 
alter decreed water priorities has the burden to demonstrate the elements of abandonment by 
clear and convincing evidence.'' Gilbert v. Smith. 97 Idaho 735, 738 (1976). Clear and convinc-
ing evidence is required if a water user tries to acquire another's water right through adverse pos-
session. Id. at 740. It is required to declare that a water right has been forfeited or abandoned. 
Jenkins v. State, 103 Idaho 384, 388-89 (1982). It is also required in water adjudication or quiet 
title cases where a comi is asked to allow new appropriations or to permanently fix title to water 
rights and establish priority dates and quantities. Crow v. Carlson, 107 Idaho 461, 467 ( 1984 ); 
Sil key v. Tiegs. 51 Idaho 344 (1931) ("Sil key f'): Sil key v. Tiegs. 54 Idaho 126 ( 1934) ("Sil key 
!!'). These actions are all adjudicative in nature because they permanently redefine, eliminate, or 
fix title to water rights. 
In contrast, the allocation of water between existing water rights is an administrative 
function that does not alter the defined elements of water rights. The detennination of material 
injury under the CM Rules does not alter the elements of the senior's water right, but evaluates 
the senior's cunent need for water and ensures that water is not wasted or hoarded contrary to 
the public policy of reasonable use of water. CM Rules 42.01 and 20.03. This Comi confirmed in 
AFRD2 that "evaluation of whether a diversion is reasonable in the administration context should 
not be deemed a re-adjudication," and that "determining whether waste is taking place is not a 
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re-adjudication because clearly that too, is not a decreed element of the right:' 143 Idaho at 877. 
This Court recognized that "water rights adjudications neither address, nor answer, the questions 
presented in delivery calls." Id. at 876. 
The material injury factors in CM Rule 42 illustrate that the analysis is not concerned 
with defining the maximum parameters of authorized water use, but of meeting the senior's cur-
rent water needs. The factors instruct the Director to consider such things as the effort and ex-
pense to divert from the source ( 42.01. b ); rate of diversion, acres, efficiencies, and irrigation me-
thod (42.01.d); amount of water used compared to the water right (42.01.e); whether the senior 
can meet his or her needs with existing facilities, reasonable diversion and conveyance efficien-
cies, or conservation practices (42.01.g); and alternate reasonable means of diversion (42.01.h). 
None of these factors are concerned with defining maximum parameters of authorized 
water use, and they do not permanently alter or fix the elements of the senior's water right. They 
are concerned with present water needs, and they are subject to change. Tf the Director deter-
mines that a senior can meet its current irrigation needs with less than the maximum authorized 
rate of diversion, that does not preclude the Director from later revisiting the issue and finding 
that the senior needs additional water. For instance, if a senior must convert its delivery system 
to a less efficient means of irrigation, the Director has authority under the CM Rules to reeva-
luate circumstances and make corresponding redetermination of material injury. In neither case 
are the elements of the water right altered; in neither case should clear and convincing evidence 
be required. 
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C. Courts in other jurisdictions distinguish between the distribution of water 
and the adjudication of water rights, and apply different standards of proof. 
The distinction between the distribution of water and the adjudication of water rights-
and the need for different standards of proof~has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a water right decree for the North 
Platte River, and held that decisions involving the enforcement of priorities under the decree (i.e. 
the distribution of water) should be based on the preponderance of the evidence, whereas modifi-
cations of the decree (i.e. adjudicative decisions) require a higher standard of clear and convinc-
ing proof. 507 U.S. 584, 590-92 (1993). The Court recognized that the "two types of proceeding 
are markedly different." Id. at 592. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court has specifically considered the appropriate standard of 
proof to be applied in the conjunctive management context. In W;[[adsen v. Christopulos, the 
court considered a delivery call by the holder of a surface water right against a junior-priority 
groundwater right that was allegedly depleting the senior's stream flow. WWadsen, 731 P.2d 
1181, 1182 (Wyo. 1987). The State Engineer (equivalent to the Director in Idaho) found insuffi-
cient evidence of interference, and therefore refused to curtail the junior right. Id. On appeaL the 
senior challenged the State Engineer's conclusion on the basis that he applied the wrong standard 
of proof. The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the State Engineer's decision, ruling that the de-
cision of whether to cmiail the junior groundwater user was properly based on "the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard customarily used in civil cases." Id. at 1184. 
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Like the U.S. Supreme Court in the Nebraska case, and the Wyoming Supreme Court in 
the Willadsen case, this Court should recognize the distinction between adjudication of water 
rights and the distribution of water among established rights and hold that the preponderance of 
the evidence standard applies to water administration decisions. 
D. Key holdings and rationale in AFRD2 support the application of the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard in the conjunctive management context. 
In AFRD2. this Court did not enunciate the evidentiary standard that applies in the con-
junctive management context, but did explain that "to the extent the Constitution, statutes and 
case law have identified the proper presumptions, burdens of proof evidentiary standards and 
time parameters, those are part of the CM Rules." AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 873. No Idaho case di-
rectly addresses what standard of proof applies to conjunctive administration, but the Legislature 
has instructed the Director, when allocating water between existing rights, to "equally guard all 
the various interests involved." Idaho Code§ 42-101. This suggests that when it comes to water 
distribution, the Director should not presume that material injury does or does not exist, but 
should instead make that determination based on the preponderance of the evidence before him. 
Director Dreher believed this to be the right to approach to conjunctive management, explaining 
that 
under this whole conflict that had developed, my view was that it was the State's 
responsibility - the department's responsibility to initially take the burden of de-
termining the extent of injury and the appropriate recourse. Some might say, well. 
that burden should be put on the juniors. They ought to have to prove the nega-
tive. They ought to come in and prove that they're not causing injury. 
Well, the reason I disagree with that is because it's the State that authorized those 
junior-priority diversions. It's the State that issued those licenses. And the junior 
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rightholders. even though they're junior and even though they are subject to all 
prior rights, their rights are real too. They had just been decreed in the SRBA, and 
I didn't think it was appropriate to say, okay, prove that you're not causing injury; 
we - the State has issued these water rights, we issued these decrees, now prove 
that you're not causing injury. I didn't think that was the appropriate way to do 
this. 
Similarly, it certainly was inappropriate to, at least in my view, put the burden on 
the seniors. Okay. You allege you're being injured. Now, prove it. I didn't think 
that was appropriate. 
And so in developing this May 2nd Order, I tried to develop a process under which 
the State would take the initial burden of making these determinations. and then 
there would be a hearing ... under which the factual issues and the legal issues 
were resolved. 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 50-52.) 
This Court's rationale and holdings in AFRD2 lead to the same conclusion. In AFRD2 the 
SWC argued that the factors set forth in CM Rule 42 are unconstitutional because they authorize 
the Director to effectively re-adjudicate the elements of the senior's water right. This Court re-
jected that argument, recognizing that "water rights adjudications neither address. nor answer, 
the questions presented in delivery calls; thus, responding to delivery calls, as conducted pur-
suant to the CM Rules, do not constitute a re-adjudication." 143 Idaho at 876-77. The Court un-
derstood, like the U.S. Supreme Court in Nebraska and the Wyoming Supreme Court in WWad-
sen, that the decisions that must be made in the distribution of water are markedly different than 
those that must be made in a water right adjudication. Since AFRD2 confirms that a delivery call 
proceeding is administrative in nature (as opposed to adjudicative), it supports application of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. 
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Other holdings in A FRD2 further support the preponderance of the evidence standard for 
water administration decisions under the CM Rules. Although the senior is presumed to be en-
titled to its full decreed water right, this Court held that the senior is not presumed to suffer ma-
terial injury. Id. at 876-77. The district court had relied on an old surface water administration 
case, Moe v. Harger, 10 Idaho 302 (1904), to hold that ''when a junior diverts or withdraws wa-
ter in times of water shortage, it is presumed there is injury to the senior." A FRD2, 143 Idaho at 
877. This Court rejected that ruling, and pointed out that Moe "was a case dealing with compet-
ing surface water rights, and this is a case involving interconnected ground and surface water 
rights. The issues presented are simply not the same." Id. 
The preponderance of the evidence standard is further wananted by the fact that the ma-
terial injury determination requires the Director to "evaluate whether the senior is putting the wa-
ter to beneficial use," Id. at 876, "whether the holders of water rights are using water efficiently 
and without waste," Id. at 875, and "the reasonableness of a diversion, the reasonableness of use 
and full economic development," Id. at 876, al I of which necessitate "some exercise of discretion 
by the Director." Id. at 875. These decisions naturally require the exercise of technical judgment 
and discretion, which is why the Director is required by law to be a licensed engineer, Idaho 
Code §4 2-170 l (2), and instructed to uti I ize his "experience, technical competence, and specia-
lized knowledge" when administering water. Idaho Code ~ 67-5251 (5); see also IDAPA 
37.01.01.600. Such decisjons should be made in the Director's best judgment, based on the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 
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E. The preponderance of the evidence standard affords presumptive weight to 
the decree. 
The A &B Decision was concerned with the statement in AFRD2 that a senior is presumed 
to be entitled to their decreed amount of water. (Sup. Ct. Order Augmenting Record, Aug. 3, 
201 l, pp. 34-35.) The A&B Decision concludes that. given this presumption, a "clear and con-
vincing proof' standard must apply, reasoning that 'lt]o conclude otherwise accords no pre-
sumptive weight to the decree." !d. at 34, n. 12. This conclusion mistakenly presumes that a de-
cree' s presumptive weight in and of itself defies a preponderance of the evidence standard for 
determining material injury. 
The presumption is simply the starting point against which the burden of proof (clear and 
convincing or preponderance) is measured. The presumption that a senior is entitled to their de-
creed amount exists whether the standard to prove otherwise is ''clear and convincing" or "pre-
ponderance."' Even under a preponderance of the evidence standard, the senior still benefits from 
the presumption by receiving his full decreed amount unless and until the preponderance of the 
evidence shows that the senior's irrigation needs can be met with something less than the full 
decreed amount. For example, the SWC's water rights presumptively entitle it to divert 9 million 
acre-feet of water. For the Director to deliver less, the preponderance of the evidence must show 
that the SWC can meet its irrigation needs with less than 9 million acre-feet. The preponderance 
of the evidence standard stil I affords the presumption of entitlement to the ful I decreed amount. 
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F. The cases cited by the district court do not define the standard of proof ap-
plicable to water administration decisions under the CM Rules. 
The A&B Decision and the A&B Rehearing Decision rely on a number of surface water 
cases to conclude that in the conjunctive management context the Director must presume that 
material injury exists until proven otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 34-35 (cit-
ing Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179 ( 1964 ), Crow v. Carlson, 107 Idaho 461 ( 1984), Jenkins v. 
IDFVR, 103 Idaho 384 (1982), and Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735 (1976)); Appx. A at 9-10 (cit-
ingMoev. Harger.10Idaho302(1904),Josslynv. Daly, IS Idaho 137(1908),Neilv. l!yde,32 
Idaho 576 (191 and Jackson v. Cowan, Idaho (1921)). These cases are all distinguisha-
ble because they all deal with competing surface water rights and therefore do not address the 
unique issues involved in conjunctive administration. See, AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 877. These cas-
es are distinguishable for additional reasons as well, as set forth below. 
Cantlin, Josslyn, and Moe are distinguishable because they involve the granting of new 
appropriations which is an adjudicative act. The U.S. Supreme Court explained in Colorado v. 
New A4exico why the granting of a new appropriation warrants a heightened standard of proof: 
Requiring Colorado to present clear and convincing evidence in support of its 
proposed diversion is necessary to appropriately balance the unique interests in-
volved in water rights disputes between sovereigns. The standard reflects this 
Court's long-held view that a proposed diverter should bear most, though not all, 
of the risks of erroneous decision: The harm that may result from disrupting es-
tablished uses is typically certain and immediate, whereas the potential benefits 
from a proposed diversion may be speculative and remote. 
467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (internal quotations omitted). While that case involved an appropria-
tion of interstate water, the court's reasoning applies equally to new appropriations of intrastate 
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water. In both instances, granting a new water right whose benefit may be speculative and re-
mote is much different than allocating water between proven beneficial uses under established 
water rights. 
Crow, .Jenkins, and Gilbert are distinguishable because they involve claims of abandon-
ment, forfeiture. and adverse possession which are also adjudicative in nature because they per-
manently extinguish the right to divert water. 
Neil and Jackson involve claims that the use of junior rights will not affect the senior due 
to a lack of hydraulic connectivity, but in neither case does the Court enunciate a heightened 
standard of proof. Neil, 32 Idaho at 587; Jackson, 33 Idaho at 528. This Court held in both cases 
that the burden is on the junior to prove the lack of connection, but did not state that clear and 
convincing evidence is required. Id. 
The A&B Rehearing Decision cites two additional cases involving groundwater rights, 
but they are also adjudicative in nature. S;lkey v. Tiegs, 51 Idaho 344 (1931) ("Si/key I"); S;tkey 
v. Tiegs, 54 Idaho 126 (1934) ("S;/key If'). Silkey I involves a water right adjudication and entry 
of decree that permanently defined the elements of various water rights. s;lkey JI involves a mo-
tion to modify the decree to allow a junior user to divert more water. Since both cases involve 
the permanent definition of the elements of water rights, they are not conclusive as to the stan-
dard of proof that should apply to the Director's determination of material injury when respond-
ing to a delivery call under the CM Rules. 
Finally, the A &B Rehearing Dedsion addresses the sole case involving the administration 
of groundwater: Jones v. Vanausdeln 28 Idaho 743 (1916). In Jones, a senior groundwater user 
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sought an injunction against the operation of a junior-priority well. Id. at 746. This Court had 
previously held in Moe and Joss~yn that a "subsequent appropriator who claims that such diver-
sion will not injure the prior appropriator below him should be required to establish that fact by 
clear and convincing evidence." Moe, 10 Idaho at 307; Josslyn 15 Idaho at 149. Yet this Court 
did not require the same showing in Jones. Instead, this Court required the senior to provide 
"very convincing proof of the interference of one well with the flow of another .. before a court 
of equity would be justified in restraining its proprietors from operating it on that ground." Id. at 
749. This Court recognized that a dispute over the administration of groundwater ''differs some-
what from the ordinary action for the adjudication of conflicting water rights on the same 
stream." Id. at 752. 
The A&B Rehearing decision attempts to reconcile Jones with the surface water cases by 
ruling that: 
Jones instructs that the initial burden rests upon the senior appropriator to estab-
lish that he and the junior appropriator receive water from the same hydraulically 
connected source. Once it is determined that the senior and junior derive water 
from a common source, as was the case in the above-mentioned cases except for 
Jones, the burden rests on the junior appropriator to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that his use will not injure the senior's right to use. 
(Appx. B at 11.) The problem with this conclusion is two-fold. First, the other cases involve sur-
face water administration, and the issues in determining material injury in the conjunctive man-
agement context "are simply not the same." AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 877. Second, the SRBA court 
has eliminated the senior's burden to prove hydraulic connectivity, by entering an order that 
creates a presumption in favor of the senior that all water sources are hydraulically connected 
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unless proven otherwise. (Appx. A at 12.) The effect of the order is that the junior now bears the 
burden to disprove connectively, effectively reversing the burden set forth in Jones. 
The district court's attempt to amalgamate Jones with the surface water cases is not in 
harmony with this Court's holding in AFRD2, and unnecessarily forces the Director's determina-
tion of material injury into the familiar constructs of surface water administration and water 
rights adjudications. 
Given the significant differences between the issues that must be addressed in the adjudi-
cation of water rights as compared to the distribution of water among established rights, the rec-
ognition by courts in other jurisdictions that these differences warrant different standards of 
proof, and the key holding in AFRD2 that the Director is not to presume that material injury ex-
ists, this Court should hold that the administrative decisions required of the Director when res-
ponding to a delivery call under the CM Rules should be based on the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. 
RESPONSE TO SWC'S OPENING BRIEF 
The SWC Opening Brief is principally dedicated to the argument that the Director's use 
of a "minimum full supply" to determine material injury violates Idaho law. (SWC Open. Br. 15-
30.) As set forth below, the entire argument is moot because the Director no longer utilizes the 
"minimum full supply" methodology. Even if this Court decides to consider SWC's "minimum 
full supply" argument, it should be rejected because it is predicated on the false premise that dep-
letion to the water supply automatically equals material injury, regardless of the senior's actual 
beneficial use of water. 
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1. The SWC argument concerning "minimum full supply" is moot. 
"A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome. An issue is moot if it presents no justiciable contro-
versy and a judicial determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome." Schools for 
Equal Education Opportunity v. Idaho State Board of Education, 128 Idaho 276 (1996); See al-
so, Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432 (1991 ). 
The Director utilized the concept of "minimum full supply" in the original 2005 Curtail-
ment Order as part of his determination of material injury under CM Rule 42. (R. Vol. 8, pp. 
13 77-80.) He calculated the "minimum full supply" as the amount of water "necessary to meet 
water needs independent of the licensed, decreed or contracted rights." (R. Vol. 3 7, p. 7087 .) It 
was "an attempt to predict the minimum amount of water the surface water users need to meet 
their crop requirements, below which curtailment is necessary if the minimum is not met as a 
consequence of junior ground water depletions." Id. 
In response to criticisms by the Hearing Officer concerning the Director's methodology 
for calculating "minimum full supply," the Director developed a new methodology for determin-
ing material injury, termed "reasonable in-season demand." (Cl. R. Vol. 7, p. 1354(s).) The ques-
tion of whether the new "reasonable in-season demand" methodology comports with Idaho law 
is currently on appeal in Minidoka County consolidated case no. CV-2010-382. 
Since the Director has abandoned the "minimum full supply" methodology, there is no 
need for this Court to determine whether or not it is legally justifiable. Such a determination will 
have no practical effect on the outcome of this case. The issue is moot. 
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2. Depletion does not automatically equal material injury. 
If the Court does consider the SWC's "minimum full supply'' argument, it should be re-
jected because it is predicated on the false premise that depletion to the water supply automati-
cally equals material injury, regardless of the senior's actual beneficial use of water. 
The SWC argues that "the Director and watermasters must regulate and distribute water 
to water rights." (SWC Open. Br. 21, emphasis in original) They say that "any hindrance to either 
a natural flow or a storage water right (including the right to carryover storage) constitutes 'ma-
terial injury' that must be mitigated either through curtailment or an approved CM Rule 43 miti-
gation plan." Id. at 16. They go so far as to argue that anytime a senior merely claims to be suf-
fering material injury, then "material injury is presumed." Id. In other words, their position is 
that depletion to the water supply automatically equals material injury, regardless of whether the 
senior needs and will beneficially use additional water. The SWC argument is inconsistent with 
the definition of "material injury" given in the CM Rules, and it has already been rejected by this 
Com1. 
The distinction between injury to the water supp(y versus injury to the use of water is sig-
nificant. If injury is measured merely by an impact to the supply of water, then the senior is au-
tomatically injured any time the water supply provides less than the maximum rate of diversion 
authorized under his water right, regardless of whether l1e actually needs additional water to ac-
complish his beneficial use. On the other hand, if injury is measured by the impact to the senior's 
beneficial use of water, then the senior 
needs. 
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injury only if he is unable to meet his irrigation 
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The CM Rules, Idaho Code, and prior decisions from this Court unifonnly confirm that 
injury is measured by the impact on the use of water. 
CM Rule 42 defines "material injury" as "hindrance to or impact upon the exercise of a 
water right" CM Rule I 0.14 (emphasis added). The term "exercise" is significant. It means "[a]n 
act of employing or putting to use." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 
New Dell Ed., 198 l, p. 251. By including the word "exercise," the term "material injury" de-
notes impact to the use of water, not merely impact to the amount of water available for diver-
s1on. 
This is consistent with the !daho Code, which provides that an "appropriation must be for 
some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases 
to use it for such purpose, the right c~ases." Idaho Code § I 04; see also, § 42-220 ("neither 
such licensee nor any one claiming a right under such shall at any time be entitled to the 
use of more water than can be beneficially applied .... '') 
Precedent from this Court confirms that injury is measured by beneficial use of water. 
More than a century ago, this Court held "the law only allows the appropriator the amount ac-
tually necessary for the useful or beneficial purpose to which he applies it." Abbott v. Reedy, 9 
Idaho 577, 581 (1904) (emphasis in original); see also, Cotant v. Jones, 3 Idaho 606, 613 (1893) 
(a water user is "only entitled to such water, from year to year, as he puts to a beneficial use.") In 
Glavin v. Salmon River Canal Co., this Court explained that 
[i]t is against the public policy of this state, as well as against express enactments. 
for a water user to take more of the water to which he is entitled than is necessary 
for the beneficial use for which he has appropriated it ... Public policy demands 
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that, whatever be the extent of a proprietor's right to use water until his needs are 
supplied, his right is dependent upon his necessities, and ceases with them. 
44 Idaho 583, 589 (1927); see also, Mountain Home Irr. Dist. v. DuffY, 79 Jdaho 435, 442 (1957) 
(" ... it is the duty of the prior appropriator to allow the water, which he has the right to use, to 
flow down the channel for the benefit of junior appropriators at times when he has no immediate 
need for the use tbereof.") This Court has further held that injury requires evidence of "not mere-
ly a fanciful injury but a real and actual injury." Beecher v. Cassia Creek Irr Co., 66 Idaho 1, 7 
(1944). 
This is not the first time that tbe SWC has argued that depletion to the water supply au-
tornatically equals material injury. The SWC made the same argument in AFRD2, claiming that 
by allowing the Director to consider tbe senior's actual beneficial use of water the CM Rules 
·'flip the law of prior appropriation on its head" and result in "reverse 'first in time, first in right." 
(Pis' Br. in Resp. to Def~· 'and JGWA 's Open. Brs., Idaho S. Ct. Docket Nos. 33249, 33311. 
33399 (Nov. JO, 2006), attacbed hereto as Appendix B at 14, 16.) The SWC's position was that 
"water rigbts in Idaho should be administered strictly on a priority in time basis.'· AFRD2. 143 
Idaho at 870. 
The district court decision in AFRD2 accepted the SWC's argument, relying on A1oe to 
conclude that "when a junior diverts or withdraws water in times of water sbortage, it is pre-
surned that there is injury to a senior." AFRD2, 143 Idaho at 877 (citing Moe, 10 Idaho 302 
(1904)). This Court reversed the district court on this point, ruling instead that "depletion does 
not equate to material injury," tbat "[b ]ecause the amount of water necessary for beneficial use 
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can less than decreed or licensed quantities. it is possible for a senior to less than the 
decreed or licensed amount, but not suffer injury," and that "senior surface water right holders 
cannot demand that junior ground water right holders diverting water from a hydraulically-
connected aquifer be required to make water available for diversion unless that water is neces-
sary to accomplish an authorized beneficial use." Id. at 868. This Court reasoned that "[i]f this 
Court were to rule the Director lacks the power in a delivery call to evaluate whether the senior is 
putting the water to beneficial use, we would be ignoring the constitutional requirement that 
priority over water be extended only to those using the water." Id at 876. Accordingly, the Court 
held that while the Director must presume that the senior is entitled to his full decreed quantity, 
the Director's evaluation of material injury when "responding to delivery calls, as conducted 
pursuant to the [CM Rules], does [sic] not constitute a re-adjudication." Id. at 876-77. 
The importance of evaluating beneficial use is illustrated by the difference between the 
maximum amounts of water authorized for diversion under the SWC's natural flow and storage 
water rights (9 million acre-feet) and the amounts of water it actually diverts (no more than 4 
million acre-feet). (Ex. 3007A, Table 7, . 8000 at Vol. 4 p. AS-8.) Director Dreher explained 
what the result would be in this case if the Director had no discretion to examine SW C's benefi-
cial of water, but instead had to administer strictly based on the maximums: 
If administration of these junior-priority rights is going to be based upon the max-
imum quantity authorized under these surface water rights, there will be no 
ground water irrigation in Idaho. It's not possible .... there will be a whole lot of 
water that goes down the Snake River in flood control releases and out of the state 
without being beneficially used ... look at the f1ood control releases that occur 
with ground water depletions. 
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Vol. ], pp. 170-171.) Accordingly, both Hearing Officer Schroeder and Director Tuthill 
concluded that "depletion does not equate to material injury. but that the determination of 
whether a senior is materially injured is instead a "highly fact specific inquiry.'' (R. Vol. 39, p. 
7388.) 
For these reasons, this Court should reject SWC's proposition that depletion to the water 
supply automatically equals material injury. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the district court and uphold the preponderance of the evidence 
standard of proof for determining material injury under the CM Rules because (a) most agency 
administrative decisions are governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard. (b) the 
heightened clear and convincing standard that applies to adjudicative actions should not apply to 
the administrative act of distributing water among established rights, (iii) courts in other jurisdic-
tions apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to water distribution decisions, (iv) this 
Court's decision in AFRD2 supports using a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, (v) 
the preponderance of the evidence standard affords presumptive weight to the decree, and (vi) 
the cases relied on by the district court are not definitive with respect to the standard of proof that 
applies to the decisions that must be made by the Director when responding to a del 
der the CM Rules. 
call un-
This Court should not consider the SWC's arguments concerning the "minimum 
supply" methodology because it has been superseded by the "reasonable in-season demand" me-
thodology which is on a separate appeal. The issue of "minimum full supply" is moot because a 
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decision on the issue will have no practical outcome on this case. Even if this Court considers the 
SWC's argument concerning the "minimum full supply" methodology, it should be rejected be-
cause it is predicated on the false premise that depletion to the water supply does automatically 
equates to material injury. 
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John K. Simpson, Travis L. Thompson, Paul Arrington, Sarah W. Higer, Barker Rosholt 
& Simpson, LLP, Twin Falls, Idaho, on behalf of Petitioner A & B Irrigation District, 
("A & B"); 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING 
Chris M. Bromley, Deputy Attorney General of the State ofldaho, Idaho Department of 
Water Resources, Boise, Idaho, on behalf of Respondents Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and Gary Spackman in his capacity as Interim Director of the Idaho 
Department of Water Resources, ("Director," "ID.\VR" or "Department"); 
Randall C. Budge, Candice M. McHugh, Scott J. Smith, Racine Olson Nye Budge & 
Bailey, Chartered, Pocatello, Idaho, on behalf of Respondent Idaho Ground Water 
Appropriators, Inc. ("IOWA"); 
Sarah A. Klahn, White & Jankowski, LLP, Denver, Colorado, A. Dean Trarnner, 
Pocatello, Idaho, on behalf of Respondent City of Pocatello ("City of Pocatello"); 
Jerry R. Rigby, Rigby, Andrus & Rigby, Chartered, Rexburg, Idaho, on behalf of 
Fremont Madison Irrigation District, Robert & Sue Huskinson, Sun-Glo Industries, Val 
Schwendiman Fanns, Inc., Darrell C. Neville, Scott C. Neville, and Stan D. Neville, 
("Fremont-Madison et. al."). 
I. PROCEDURE 
A. Issue on rehearing. 
On rehearing this Court is asked by the Department, IGW A and the City of 
Pocatello (collectively as "Ground Water Users") to reconsider its ruling in the 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Petition for Judicial Review (May 4, 2010) 
("Order") regarding the appropriate burden of proof and evidentiary standards applied in 
a delivery call made pursuant to the Department's Rules for Conjunctive Management of 
Surface and Ground Water Resources, IDAPA 37.03.11. ("CMR"). In particular, the 
issue pertains to the standard of proof and burdens necessary to support a determination 
of no material injury when the determination relies on a finding by the Director that the 
water requirements of the senior right holder initiating the call can be satisfied with less 
than the decreed quantity. This Court held that such a finding must be supported by clear 
and convincing evidence. The issue on rehearing therefore involves the significance of a 
partial decree in a delivery call proceeding made pursuant to the CMR, and the standard 
of proof required to support a determination by the Director that the senior user initiating 
the call requires less water than previously decreed. 
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B. The purpose of the remand. 
The Order remanded the case to the Director for application of the standard of 
proof to his detennination that A & B could get by with less water than decreed to it in 
the SRBA. In the June 30, 2009, Final Order, the Director did not state the evidentiary 
standard applied. In Sagewillow, Inc. v. !DWR, 138 Idaho 831, 843, 70 P.3d 669. 681 
(2003) the Idaho Supreme Court held that where the Department failed to state whether 
or not its findings were based on clear and convincing evidence it was outside the role of 
the reviewing court to review the evidence and decide whether there was clear and 
convincing evidence supporting the Department's findings. Following Sagewillow, this 
Court did not review the evidence to determine whether the above-mentioned finding was 
supported by clear and convincing evidence, but rather remanded the case to the Director 
to make such a determination. 
C. The reasoning supporting the Order. 
This Court reasoned that a decreed quantity in a SRBA decree is a judicial 
determination of the quantity of water put to beneficial use consistent with the purpose of 
use for which rhe right was decreed. Therefore, any determination that a senior right 
holder can accomplish the purpose of use for the water right on a quantity less than 
decreed would be akin to a finding of waste because the senior would not be making 
beneficial use of the entire decreed quantity. No material injury to the senior water right 
would inure and junior rights could not be regulated to satisfy the senior's decreed 
quantity. In the Order, the Court held that a finding of waste requires the higher standard 
of clear and convincing evidence. 
The holding reconciled the objectives of giving proper effect and certainty to the 
adjudicated elements of a water right while at the same time also giving effect to the 
CMR by acknowledging that a quantity less than decreed may be all that is necessary to 
satisfy a senior right at the time a delivery call is made. The reasoning, however, placed 
any risk of uncertainty in the Director's determination resulting in the senior having an 
insufficient water supply on junior water rights. Absent a higher standard, the senior 
making the call can be put in the position of re-proving or re-I itigating quantity 
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requirements for a particular water right. Simply put, if the Director is going to 
administer to provide the senior with less than the decreed quantity, talcing into account 
the implementation of any reasonable measures imposed on the senior, the Director 
should be convinced to a high degree of certainty that his determination will provide the 
senior with sufficient water to accomplish the purpose of use. The high degree of 
certainty is necessary because a water right is a valuable property right. If the Director is 
turns out to be incorrect in his determination that senior can get by with less than the 
decreed quantity of water, the senior will receive less water than he would otherwise be 
entitled under the decree. Under those circumstances the senior is in effect deprived a 
portion of his property right. Such diminishment of the senior's right should only be 
made through the evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence. 
II. CLARIFICATION, RESPONSES TO ISSUES RAISED AND DISCUSSION 
A. The clear and convincing standard does not guarantee the senior the decreed 
quantity nor does it require that the Directo.r administer according to strict priority. 
The Ground Water Users argue the Court's Order results in requiring that the 
Director administer strictly to the decree unless juniors intervene and demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence less water is necessary. This argument misunderstands the 
Court's Order. 
1. The presumptions and burdens of proof were not clearly addressed in the 
administrative proceedings as required by AFRD #2. 
This Court previously discussed the significance of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in American Falls Reservoir District No. 2. v. JD WR, 143 Idaho 862, 154 P .3d 
433 (2007) (AFRD #2). Order, 27-28. The Supreme Court held that the CMR survived 
a facial challenge despite the lack of stated burdens of proof and evidentiary standards 
applicable to a delivery call. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the Department is 
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still required to apply the proper evidentiary standards and burdens of proof in order to 
apply the CMR in a constitutional or "as applied" manner. In the instant case, the 
evidentiary standards and burdens of proof were not clearly articulated by the Director. 
i. Administration of rights in an organized water district does not avoid 
the application of the established burdens of proof. 
The CMR distinguish between whether or not administration is sought in an 
organized water district. (Compare CMR Rule 40 and Rule 30). The initiation of a 
contested case is not required in an organized water district. This is significant because 
in an organized water district, water rights must first be adjudicated. See I.C. § 42-604 
(requirements for water district). In responding to a delivery call in an organized water 
district, the Director is required to make findings and to administer rights through a water 
master if material injury is found. This is accomplished without the initiation of a 
contested case process. InAFRD #2 the Idaho Supreme Court held that "[r]equirements 
pertaining to the standard of proof and who bears it have been developed over the years 
and are to be read into the CM Rules. There is simply no basis from which to conclude 
the Director can never apply the proper evidentiary standard in responding to a delivery 
call." Id. at 874, 154 P.Jd at 445. Therefore, whether or not a junior intervenes in the 
proceedings, the Director must give effect to established evidentiary burdens and 
pres ump ti ons. 
ii. The CMR do not modify the burdens or presumptions applied in a 
delivery call. 
The Ground Water Users argue that the burden of proof is a preponderance of the 
evidence as it is the appropriate ev!dentiary standard in most administrative proceedings. 
The Ground Water Users additionally assert that the evidentiary standards that apply to 
the administration of ground water rights are different from those involving solely surface 
water administration. The Ground Water Users also argue the cases relied on by the 
Court in the Order only address surface to surface administration and that different 
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burdens and evidentiary standards apply in cases involving ground water administration. 
This Court disagrees that different burdens and evidentiary standards apply. 
Again, in AFRD #2 the Supreme Court did not hold that a different set of 
evidentiary standards and burdens apply to the administration of ground water. The 
Supreme Court held that the CMR were not unconstitutional for failing to articulate the 
appropriate standards and burdens. The Court added that "[r]equirements pertaining to 
the standard of proof and who bears it have been developed over the years and are to be 
read into the CM Rules." Id. at 874, 154 P.3d at 445. This statement is unequivocal. 
The argument that the CMR modify historically developed burdens and presumptions is 
inconsistent with that holding. 
The City of Pocatello argues that the burden is on the senior to prove material 
injury. Pocatello Opening Brief at 10-11. In AFRD #2 American Falls argued that 
specific provisions of the CMR squarely contradict Idaho law by placing the burden of 
proving material injury on the senior making the call. The Supreme Court held 
"[n]owhere do the Rules state that the senior must prove material injury before the 
Director will make such a finding. To the contrary, this Court must presume the Director 
will act in accordance with Idaho law, as he is directed to do under CM Rule 20.02 .... 
[O]ur analysis is limited to the rules as written, or 'on their face,' and the rules do not 
permit or direct the shifting of the burden of proof." Id. at 873-74, 154 P.3d at 444-45. 
Accordingly, the express provisions of the CMR do not operate to modify the historically 
recognized burdens and presumptions. 
Finally, the issue before this Court does not deal with the complexities and 
uncertainties posed by the hydraulic_ interrelation of ground and surface water. On 
rehearing, the issue focuses solely on the presumptive weight accorded a partial decree 
and the standard of proof required to support a determination that the senior initiating the 
call requires less water than previously decreed. At issue is the quantity of water 
necessary to accomplish the senior's purpose of use. 
iii. The Court's Order does not result in the Director administering rights 
strictly in accordance with the decreed quantity. 
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The Court's Order does not conclude that a senior right holder is guaranteed the 
maximum quantity decreed or that the Director is required to administer strictly 
according to the decree. Rather, the Order concludes that the decreed quantity includes a 
quantitative determination of beneficial use resulting in a presumption that the senior is 
entitled to that decreed quantity. The Order contemplates that there are indeed 
circumstances where the senior making the call may not at the present time require the 
full decreed quantity and therefore is not entitled to administration based on the full 
decreed quantity. The Order holds, however, that any determination by the Director that 
the senior is entitled to less than the decreed quantity needs to be supported by a high 
degree of certainty. 
The clear and convincing evidentiary standard is not an insurmountable standard. 
The Department is not new to the administration of water and should be able to determine 
present water requirements taking into account multiple factors including the existing 
conveyance system. If the senior right holder has made efficiencies or changes to a 
delivery system resulting in the conservation of water, such should be no more difficult to 
establish at the higher evidentiary standard. Therefore the senior is not guaranteed the 
decreed quantity nor is the Director required to administer strictly in accordance with the 
decreed quantity. While a senior may not be guaranteed the decreed quantity in a 
delivery call, he should have assurances that any reduced quantity determined to be 
sufficient to satisfy current needs is indeed sufficient. Otherwise what occurs is a 
redistribution of the senior right to be apportioned among junior rights. The 
apportionment of water among users as common property was rejected by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in the early stages of water development. Kirk v. Bartholomew, 3 Idaho 
367, 29 P. 40 (1892). 
iv. The application of a clear and convincing standard does not turn a 
delivery call proceeding into a hearing on forfeiture. 
The Ground Water Users argue that the Court's ruling essentially turns a delivery 
call into a proceeding on forfeiture. The Ground Water Users argue that that the Court's 
reliance on waste is in error because in a delivery call the senior's water right is not 
permanently reduced. This argument misses the point of the ruling. The Court simply 
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held that the quantity element represents a quantitative determination of beneficial use. 
In the delivery call, the senior's present water requirements are at issue. If it is 
determined that the senior's present use does not require the full decreed quantity, then 
the quantity called for in excess of the senior's present needs would not be put to 
beneficial use or put differently would be wasted. One leading commentator in analyzing 
the development of the use of the concepts of reasonable use and economical use in 
association with beneficial use among various western states, including Idaho, states: 
As considered and applied in these decisions, economical use is an 
antonym of waste. If an appropriator wastes, he necessarily is not using it 
economically. As he has no right to waste water unreasonably or 
unnecessarily, then of necessity he must make economical as well as 
reasonable and beneficial use .... The limitation of the appropriative right 
to economical and reasonable use thus precludes any waste of water that 
can reasonably be avoided. The use of water is so necessary as to 
preclude its being allowed to run to waste. Its 'full beneficial and 
economical use requires' that when the wants of one appropriator are 
supplied, another may be permitted to use the flow. 
Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights in the Western Nineteen States, Vol I, 502 (1971). The 
holdings of the SRBA District Court have historically viewed waste and beneficial use in 
this manner. For example, the SRBA Court rejected the inclusion of a remark in partial 
decrees which specified that the quantity sought in a delivery call is limited to that which 
the senior right holder put to beneficial use. The SRBA Court reasoned that the remark 
was not necessary because it was a restatement of the law and held "that a senior has no 
right to divert, (and therefore to 'call,') more water than can be beneficially applied. 
Stated another way, a water user has no right to waste water." Order at 32 (quoting 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Challenge; Order Granting State of Idaho 's 
Motion for the Court to Take Judicial Notice of Facts; Order of Recommitment with 
Instructions to Special Master Cushman (Nov. 23, 1999)). 
It is apparent that water quantity can be reduced based on a waste analysis without 
resulting in a permanent reduction of the water right through partial forfeiture. Only if 
the waste occurs for the statutory period can forfeiture be asserted. However, whether 
the senior's right is permanently reduced through partial forfeiture or is only temporarily 
reduced though administration in times of shortage and the reduction leaves the senior 
8 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING 
with an insufficient water supply to satisfy present needs, the property right is 
nonetheless diminished. 
B. The historically developed burdens and presumptions. 
On rehearing, the parties identify those cases that address the burdens of proof 
and evidentiary standards applicable to disputes between competing water users under 
Idaho law. A review of these cases is worthwhile. 
The early case of Moe v. Harger, I 0 Idaho 302, 77 P. 645 ( 1904) addressed a 
dispute between surface water users on a common source, the Big Lost River. The case 
was commenced by certain senior water appropriators to enjoin certain junior water 
appropriators from diverting water to the alleged injury of the seniors' rights of use. 
With respect to the applicable burdens of proof and evidentiary standards, the Court 
instructed that once the senior appropriators' rights of use are established, the burden 
shifts to the junior to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his use will not injure 
the seniors' rights of use: 
So soon as the prior appropriation and right of use is established, 1t 1s 
clear, as a proposition of law, that the claimant is entitled to have 
sufficient of the unappropriated waters flow down to his point of diversion 
to supply his right, and an injunction against interference therewith is 
. proper protective relief to be granted. The subsequent appropriator, who 
claims that such diversion will not injure the prior appropriator below him, 
should be required to establish that fact by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
Id. at 307, 77 P. at 647 (emphasis added). 
InJosslyn v. Daly, 15 Idaho 137, 96 P. 568 (1908) the Idaho Supreme Court again 
addressed a dispute between surface water users. With respect to the applicable burdens 
of proof and evidentiary standards, the Court instructed, consistent with Moe, that the 
burden is on the party alleging that his appropriation will not injure a prior appropriator's 
right of use to prove the same by clear and convincing evidence: 
It seems self-evident that to divert water from a stream or its supplies or 
tributaries must in a large measure diminish the volume of water in the 
main stream, and, where an appropriator seeks to divert water on the 
grounds that it does not diminish the volume in the main stream or 
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prejudice a prior appropriator, he should, as we observed in Moe v. 
Harger, 10 Idaho, 305, 77 Pac. 645, produce 'clear and convincing 
evidence showing that the prior appropriator would not be injured or 
affected by the diversion.' The burden is on him to show such facts. 
Id. at 149, 96 P. at 571-72 (emphasis added). 
Neil v. Hyde, 32 Idaho 576, 186 P. 710 (1920) and Jackson v. Cowan, 33 Idaho 
525, 196 P. 216 (1921) likewise involved disputes between surface water users on 
common sources. The junior appropriators in those cases argued that their use did not 
iajure the senior users. The Idaho Supreme Court directed in both cases that the burden 
of proof rested on the junior appropriators to show that their use did not injure the 
seniors, and held that the juniors in both cases failed to carry their burden. 1 Neil, 32 
Idaho at 587, 186 P. at 713; Jackson, 33 Idaho at 528, 196 at 217. 
A different issue than those addressed by the Court in the above-mentioned cases 
arose in the context of a dispute between two groups of artesian groundwater users in 
Jones v. Vanausdeln, 28 Idaho 743, 156 P. 615 (1916). In that case, the ultimate issue 
was one of hydro logic connectivity; that is, whether the respective artesian basins from 
which plaintiffs and defendants received their water were hydraulically connected: 
The ultimate fact in issue was whether the [defendants'] wells drew their 
supply from the same underground flow as [plaintiffs'] wells, thereby 
causing a diminution in the flow of the [plaintiffs'] wells. 
Id. at 751, 156 P. at 618. The district court denied plaintiffs' request that the defendants' 
use be eajoined on the grounds that no subterranean connection existed between the 
respective artesian basins and that, as a result, the two groups received their water from 
separate and unconnected sources. Id. at 747-48, 156 at 616. The Idaho Supreme Court 
confirmed, providing that when the issue is whether two sources are hydraulically 
connected, the burden of proof is on the senior appropriator to establish that such a 
connection exists before ajunior's use will be enjoined. Id. at 749, 156 at 617. 
The Idaho Supreme Court again took up a dispute between various artesian 
groundwater users in Silkey v. Tiegs, 51Idaho344, 5 P.2d 1049 (1931) ("Silkey f') and 
Silkey v. Tiegs, 54 Idaho 126, 28 P.2d 1037 (1934) ("Si/key IF'). In that case, the district 
1 Although the Court directed that the burden of proof rested with the junior appropriators, in neither case 
did the Court specify the applicable evidentiary standard the juniors had to meet. 
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court adjudicated the rights of the parties, entered a decree curtailing the rights of several 
of the junior appropriators at the request of the senior appropriator and retained 
jurisdiction over the case to adjust the allowance of water permitted each user if 
necessary. Silkey I, 51 Idaho at 348--49, 5 P.2d at 1051. Unlike.Jones, connectivity of 
source was not the ultimate issue in Silkey. Indeed, the district court found, and the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed, that "the waters flowing from the artesian well of each party is 
derived from the same source, and the supply of said wells constitutes one interdependent 
and connec~ed source of supply." Id. at 348, 5 P.2d at 1051. 
The appeal in Si/key JI arose when the junior appropriators curtailed in Si/key I 
moved the district court under its retained jurisdiction to modify its earlier decree to 
pennit them to use more water. Si/key!!, 54 Idaho at 127, 28 P.2d at 1037. The junior 
appropriators argued that such additional use would not deplete the amount of water 
available to the senior appropriator. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court's denial of the junior appropriators' motion, holding that the juniors failed to 
sustain their burden of proving that their use would not injure the senior's use: 
The burden was on appellants herein to sustain their motion by direct and 
convincing testimony, this language in ;:.;_=:;..;;;_~="'"""';..;...;i..-"-"'-==c::;.;i...::...::...::::..J.-.:_;,... 
P. 645, 646, being particularly apt: "This court has uniformly adhered to 
the principle, announced both in the Constitution and by the statute, that 
the first appropriator has the first right; and it would take more than a 
theory, and in fact clear and convincing evidence, in any given case, 
showing that the prior appropriator would not be injured or affected by the 
diversion of a subsequent appropriator, before we would depart from a 
rule so just and equitable in its application, and so generally and uniformly 
applied by the courts. 
Id. at 128-29, 28 P.2d at 1038. Consistent with Moe, the Court again made clear that the 
standard of proof was clear and convincing evidence if the juniors wished to prove that 
their use would not injure the senior appropriator. 
The case history can be reconciled. Jones instructs that the initial burden rests 
upon the senior appropriator to establish that he and the junior appropriator receive water 
from the same hydraulically connected source. Once it is determined that the senior and 
junior derive water from a common source, as was the case in all of the above-mentioned 
cases except for Jones, the burden rests on the junior appropriator to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that his use will not injure the senior's right of use. One leading 
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commentator on the subject has sumrnarized the application of the burdens of proof as 
follows: 
[WJhen a senior appropriator seeks to enjoin a junior diversion, the senior 
the person seeking judicial intervention to change an existing situation 
must prove the water sources for the two diversions are connected. But 
once hydrologic connection is shown, it becomes probable that the junior 
diversion interferes with the senior right, if the senior's source is fuliy 
appropriated by rights prior to the junior diversion. Then the junior 
appropriator - the person arguing against probabilities - must show his 
particular water use somehow does not cause interference. 
Douglas L. Grant, The Complexities of Managing Connected Surface and Ground Water 
Under the Appropriation Doctrine, 22 Land & Water L.Rev. 63, 92-93 (1987). 
It is significant that this Court established the hydrologic connection in 
1Vf emorandum Decision and Order of Partial Decree in Basin Wide Issue No. 5 
"Connected Sources General Provision" for the Snake River Basin. Among other things, 
the general provision identifies hydraulically connected ground and surface sources in the 
Snake River Basin for the purposes of administration and defining the legal relationship 
between connected sources. In pertinent part, the general provision provides as follows: 
Except as otherwise specified above, all other water rights within Basin 
will be administered as connected sources of water in the Snake River 
Basin in accordance with the prior appropriation doctrine as established by 
Idaho law. 
(emphasis added). A Partial Decree/or Connected Sources is issued for each basin 
within the Snake River Basin. Thus, unless water rights are listed as "otherwise 
specified" in the Partial Decree for Connected Sources for a given basin that the source 
from which a junior appropriator receives his water shall be administered separately from 
all other water rights in the Snake River Basin, the issue of whether or not the senior and 
junior divert water from a common source has already been answered in the positive. 
This is also consistent with the provisions of the Ground Water Act, IC. § 42-237a.g. 
which requires the Director to determine areas of the state having a common ground 
water supply. When it is determined that the area having a common ground water supply 
affects the flow of water in any stream in an organized water district, then the Director 
includes the stream in the water district. Conversely, when it is determined that the area 
having a common ground water supply does not affect the flow of a stream in an 
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organized water district, then the Director incorporates the area in a separate district. 
Under such circumstances, the senior appropriator's burden of proof to establish a 
common source is satisfied. 
TI1e burden is then on the jwlior right holder to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that his use will not injure the senior's right. One way in which this may be 
demonstrated is by showing that the senior's present water use does not require the full 
decreed quantity. A clear and convincing standard is consistent with the historically 
recognized burdens of proof and also insures that any amount determined to be sufficient 
to accomplish the present use is in fact sufficient. 
C. The significance of the decree issued in a general adjudication in a delivery 
call. 
The Ground Water Users argue the purpose and significance of a partial decree 
issued in a general adjudication differs substantially from its purpose and significance in 
delivery call proceedings. Specifically, the Ground Water Users assert the adjudication 
only establishes the historical maximum quantity that can be put to beneficial use. They 
argue that a delivery call proceeding, in contrast, requires that the Director examine the 
senior's current beneficial use requirements which may vary from the decreed quantity_, 
The argument is that the decree is only conclusive as to historical maximum beneficial 
use for the water right and has little or no relevance as to present beneficial u~e 
requirements for the same right. This Court agrees that an appropriator's present water 
requirements can vary from the quantity reflected in the decree after taking into account 
such considerations such as post decree factors. However, the Ground Water User's 
characterization of decrees minimizes their intended purpose, undermines the certainty of 
the decrees and disregards that the issues that can be raised in a general adjudication 
pertaining to the quantity element extend beyond the maximum quantity that was 
historically put to beneficial use. 
I. Idaho law contemplates certainty and finaJity so that water rights can 
be administered according to the decrees. 
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Idaho Code§ 42-1420 provides: "[t]he decree entered in a general adjudication 
shall be conclusive as to the nature and extent of all water rights in the adjudicated water 
system .... " In State v. Nelson, 131Idaho12, 16, 951P.2d943, 947 (1998), the Idaho 
Supreme Court pronounced that "[f]inality in water rights is essential." Further, "[a} 
decree is important to the continued efficient administration of a water right. The 
watermaster must look to the decree for the source of the water. ... If the provisions 
define a water right, it is essential that the provisions are in the decree, since the water 
master is to distribute water according to the adjudication decree." Id. (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). Clearly Idaho law contemplates certainty and finality of 
water right decrees for effective administration. Absent a higher evidentiary standard, 
any certainty and finality in the decree is undermined. 
The position advocated by the Ground Water Users would significantly minimize 
the purpose and utility of the decree in times of shortage and any reliance on the decree 
for effective administration, particularly in a water district, is undermined. If the sole 
purpose of the decreed quantity is to identify the maximum quantity when sufficient 
water is available, the result is that the decreed quantity has little probative or 
presumptive weight and litigation over the senior's present needs would be a virtual 
necessity in every delivery call. This is contrary to the holding in AFRD #2, which 
provides that: "The Rules should not be read as containing a burden-shifting provision to 
make the petitioner re-prove or re-adjudicate the right which he already has . . . . The 
presumption under Idaho law is that the senior is entitled to his decreed water right, but 
there may be some post-adjudication factors which are relevant to how much water is 
actually needed." Id at 877-78, 154 P.3d at 448-49 
2. The quantity element is a quantitative determination of beneficial use. 
The argument against applying the clear and convincing standard erroneously 
assumes that the decreed quantity element is not a quantitative determination of 
beneficial use. The argument assumes that the Department's role in the SRBA is to 
recommend water rights based on established historical maximum beneficial use rather 
than present beneficial use requirements. For example, the Ground Water Users assert 
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that recommendations for previously decreed and licensed rights were recommended 
based on the previously decreed or licensed quantity. As such, the last field examination 
for the right could have taken place as long ago when the right was previously decreed or 
licensed. Since that time, the right holder could have made efficiencies to the 
conveyance system thereby requiring less water than was decreed or licensed. An 
example is converting from gravity irrigation to sprinkler irrigation or a tiled ditch 
system. As a result, the Ground Water Users argue that the decreed quantity in the SRBA 
may not reflect the quantity of water that is actually put to beneficial use. The Ground 
Water Users also argue that the quantity element is a maximum which provides for the 
highest degree of flexibility to provide for the most water intensive use within the scope 
of the purpose of use. For example, a quantity sufficient to allow an irrigator to rotate 
crops allows for growing the most water intensive crop in the hottest part of the irrigation 
season. 
The argument ignores both the purpose of the decree as well as the scope of the 
issues raised in a general adjudication. This Court previously discussed the Department's 
statutory directive in issuing licenses and recommendations which limit the quantity to 
the amount of water beneficially used. Order at 28-30. Idaho Code § 42-220 provides: 
[W]hen water is used for irrigation, no such license or decree of the court 
allotting such water shall be issued confirming the right to·use more than 
one second foot of water for each fifty (50) acres of land so irrigated, 
unless it can be shown to the satisfaction of the [Department] in granting 
such license and to the court in making such decree, that a greater amount 
is necessary .... 
LC.§ 42-220 (emphasis added). Idaho Code§ 42-1420 provides "the decree entered in a 
general adjudication shall be conclusive as to the nature and extent of all water rights in 
the adjudicated system." As such, the appropriate time for contesting the Department's 
recommendation as to quantity was in the adjudication. LC. § 42-1420. 
Case law also supports the proposition that the quantity element in a decree 
represents a quantitative determination of beneficial use. Issues over excess quantity 
arise in proceedings relating to the adjudication of rights. In Abbott v. Reedy, 9 Idaho 
577, 75 P. 764 (1904), in an adjudication to determine the respective rights on Soldier 
Creek in Blaine County, the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
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It is true that he said he had been using about two inches per acre, but the 
law only allows the appropriator the amount actually necessary for the 
useful or beneficial purpose to which he applies it. The inquiry was, 
therefore, not what he had used, but how much was actually necessary. 
There was a clear and substantial conflict in the evidence as to the quantity 
of water per acre necessary for the successful irrigation of appellant's 
lands. 
Id at 578, 75 P. at 765. The issue arose in the context of an adjudication as opposed to a 
delivery call proceeding. 
The case of Farmers Cooperative Ditch Co. v. Riverside Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 525, 
102 P. 481 (1909), involved the adjudication of water rights on the Boise River. At issue 
was whether the quantity decreed for certain classes of rights exceeded the duty of water 
for the purpose of use of the rights. In deciding whether or not to grant a new trial on the 
issue, the Court relied on the following: 
In determining the duty of water, reference should always be had to lands 
that have been prepared and reduced to a reasonably good condition for 
1mgation. Economy must be required and demanded in the use of 
application of water. Water users should not be allowed an excessive 
quantity of water to compensate for and counterbalance their neglect or 
indolence in the preparation of their lands for the successful and 
economical application of the water. One farmer, although he has a 
superior water right, should not be allowed to waste enough water in the 
irrigation of his land to supply both him and his neighbor simply because 
his land is not adequately prepared for the economical application of the 
water. 
Farmers at 535-36, 102 P. 483-89. Again, the issue arose in the context of an 
adjudication as opposed to a delivery call proceeding. Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. 
Twin Falls Oakley Land & Water Co., 245 F. 30 (D. Idaho 1917), involved an action to 
quiet title of water rights held on Goose Creek in Idaho and Nevada. In applying Idaho 
law, the Court held: 
Much is said about the duty of water .... The Land and Stock Company 
insists that the duty of water should still be measured by the old method of 
irrigation of pasture and the native grasses for the production of hay, 
which was by the flooding system, that allowed the water to cover the 
surface of the soil, and actually to remain thereon for considerable periods 
of time. This method is being disapproved of in more recent years as 
wao;;teful and not an economical use. No person is entitled to more water 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING 
16 
than he is able to apply to a reasonable an economical use. True, it may be 
that good results are obtainable from the former method, but that does not 
augur that just as good results may not be secured by a much more 
moderate use, which would leave a large quantity of water for others, who 
need it as much as the Land & Stock Company. 
Id at 33-34. 
In Reno v. Richards, 3 2 Idaho l, 178 P. 81 ( 1918), one of the issues before the 
Idaho Supreme Court was the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the adjudicated 
quantity of a beneficial use claim, the Court reasoned: 
'The quantity of water decreed to an appropriator, in an action wherein 
priority of appropriation is the issue, should be upon the basis of cubic feet 
per second of time of the water actually applied to a beneficial use, and 
should be definite and certain as to the quantity appropriated and 
necessarily used by the appropriator.' 
Id at 15, 178 P.at 86. (quoting Lee v. Hanford, 21Idaho327, 121 P. 558 (1912)). 
Further: 
Water rights are valuable property, and a claimant seeking a decree of a 
court to confirm his right to the use of water by appropriation must present 
to the court sufficient evidence to enable it to make definite and certain 
findings as to the amount actually diverted and applied, as we11 as the 
amount necessary for the beneficial use for which the water is claimed. 
Id. at 15. Kinney on Irrigation provides with respect to economic use and the suppression 
of waste: 
[T]he Courts have been and are now being called upon to fix by decrees 
the duty of water for certain tracts of land .... In fixing the duty of water 
for a certain tract of land, such an amount per acre should be awarded, 
within the lawful claim of the prior appropriator, as is essential or 
necessary for the proper irrigation of the land on which the water is used, 
and upon which the duty is being fixed; which water, when economically 
applied without waste, will result in the successful growing of crops on the 
land. Further than this, as far as the rights of the prior appropriator are 
concerned, the courts should not and can not lawfully go, where the result 
would be in cutting down the quantity of water to which the prior 
appropriator is entitled and reasonably needs for his purpose and the 
awarding of a certain amount of his water to subsequent appropriators. 
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2 Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights § 905 at 1595-96 (2"d ed. 1912). 
The Ground Water l:sers assume that the quantity element of decreed water rights 
is not reflective of present needs, or is "bloated" (i.e. in excess of the quantity needed) or 
at a minimum always represents a quantity which provides for the highest degree of 
flexibility in order to allow for the most water intensive use within the scope of the 
purpose of use. The argument oversimplifies what takes place in the SRBA. Water 
rights are claimed based on pennits and licenses, prior decrees in both private and general 
adjudications), beneficial use, posted notice, and adverse possession, mesne deed 
conveyances, splits of property and appurtenant rights etc. As a result, the quantity 
claimed for one water right may include excessive water for a particular purpose while 
for another water right the quantity may provide for little or no flexibility. Therefore the 
amount of excess water, if any, or the degree of flexibility built into the quantity element 
of partial decree issued in the SRBA could be in actuality "all over the map." 
The Director's recommendation as to quantity, whether or not an in-depth field 
investigation was conducted in preparing the recommendation, is by no means the final 
word on the matter_ The quantity recommendation is subject to objections by the 
claimant and any other party to the adjudication. If such an objection is made it may be 
litigated and detennined by the Court. Issues such as waste (i.e. reasonableness of 
conveyance works), duty of water, partial forfeiture, and excessive conveyance loss can 
and have been litigated in the SRBA whether or not they were considered in the 
Director's recommendation. lf the Director makes a recommendation based on a prior 
license where the delivery system that has since changed (i.e. gravity to sprinkler), third 
parties can object and assert partial forfeiture of any quantity no longer put to beneficial 
use. Accordingly, the degree to which the quantity element is scrutinized varies among 
the decrees issued in the SRBA. Nonetheless, parties were provided the opportunity to 
raise and litigate issues affecting quantity. Consequently, the partial decree issued in the 
SRBA is consistent with Idaho law and represents a quantitative determination of 
beneficial use. 
The result is that the issues litigated and evidence presented in support of the 
quantity element in the adjudication can be exactly the same as tbe issues presented and 
the evidence relied upon in conjunction with the delivery call. As such, depending on the 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
J. Nature of the Case 
The Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer ("ESP A") is bydraul ically connected to Ll-ie Snake River 
and its tributary suiface water sources (springs, streams) at various places and to varying 
degrees. t All water sources in the Snake fuver Basin, including the ESP A, are deemed 
connected and must be ad.ministered as connected sources. 2 The Jdaho Constitution and water 
dist1ibution statmes require that "(p]riority of appropriations shall give the better rig:'lt as 
between those using the water". lDAHO CONST., art. XV, § 3; J.C. §§ 42-106, 602, 607. Water 
. .. ___ rights to_ th.~. Snake _Riv.~r and its ~l;>l;ltary springs. ar~ therefo!e entitled to constitutionaJ 
protection against out-of-priority ground water diversions from the ESPA. 
How is it 1hen that junior priority ground water rights are pe1mitted to intercept and take 
water away from connec\ed senior surface water rights? The l'!nswer: under the cloak of the 
Department's Ruies for Conjunctive Management of Connected Sw:face and Ground Water 
Resources (lDAPA 37.03.1 J et seq.) ('Rules"). Recognizing this threat to ldaho' s Jaw of water 
dis1ribution, as established well over a century ago, the district court declared the Depaitmeot's 
R uJes facially unconsti rutional. 
1 R \I ol. JV, p. 754 (Water District l 20 Order at p. 4, V 19); p. 762 (Water Districl l 30 Order at p. 4, ~ J 9). The 
Director of the Idaho Depanment of Water Resources ("Departmem") previously found tba1 g;ound water diversior.s 
in certain areas of the ESPA reduce fl ows in connected spring5 and the Snake R.iver by an amount equal to 50% of 
those diversions within six months. R Ex. J; S1eenson Alf, Ex.. Y (Thousand Springs G \VMA Order at p. 2, ~ 4 of; 
see olso, Ex. B 10 Affidavit of Travis L. Thompson in SuppoH of Opposition to Morion for Stuy Pending Appeal 
Under Jdaho Appellate Rule J 3(g! (American Falls GVi'MA Order at p. 2, 14)(filed with this Coun in thi's appeal on 
August 3 l, 2006) . 
1 R Vol. JV, p. 806 (''the fotm of the conjunctive management general provision is hereby decreed as set forth in the 
artacned 'Exhibit A' ."); pp. 807-808 (Exhibit A stating "Except as otherwise specified above, all other water rights 
within Basin will be administered as connected sources of water in the Snake River Ba..c.in in accordance with the 
prior appropriation doc:tiine as established by ldaho Jaw."). 
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Before this Coun is an appeal of the district court's decision granting Plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment. The district coun found that the Rules fail to include necessary 
constitutional components and protections for senior water rights which results in an unlav.ful 
diminishment and ''taking" of those property rights. 3 These issues were directly raised by the 
Plaintiffs and argued before the district court. 4 The constitutional protections afforded senior 
water rights in Idaho's prior appropriation system are much more than mere "procedures" to be 
altered at tbe whim of an administrative officer. The constitutional protections afforded seniors, 
including honoring a water right' s priority date and other decreed elements, are subverted 
through administration under the Rules. Accordingly, the district court rightly declared the 
Rules unconstitutional and L11 conflict with Jda.l-io's water distribution statutes. This Court shouJd 
affirm. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL5 
J. \\'hether the district court en-ed in finding that the Rules disparate treatment of ground 
water rights and smface water rights does not violate equal protection'/ 
2. \lv'hetber Plaintiffs are entitied to attorneys fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Appellate 
Rule 40and~1, and J.C.§§ J 2-l J 7? 
; The Rules are found i11 the reco1d at R. Vol. 1, pp. l 5-28. All furure cites to the Rules will consist of the word 
"Rule" and the respective rule numbei ;-ather than a reference to the record. The diS1Ti:::t court's June 2, 2006 Order 
on Plaimifjs' Motion for SummaJ)' Judgmenl is found at R. Vol. X, pp. 2337-2477. All furore cites to this decision 
wilJ consist of the word "Order" and the respective page number rather than a reference to the record. 
4 Contrary to tlie Defendants' representations (D~(s. Br. Al 5, l4), the issue of the Rules' failure to include the 
constitutiona ! protections afforded senior rights was directly briefed and argued by the Plaintiffs to the district coun. 
R. Vol.lX, pp. 2267-68; T. Vol. l. pp. l 89-l 9 J, 252-53, 264, 3 J 9-320. 
3 Plaintiffs join in the arguments in the TSWlJA I Ran gen response brief, including the equal protection arguments, 
as well as the response brief of the Idaho Power Company. Clear Springs joins in those briefs and this one as well. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW6 
L Summary Judgment & Constitutional Issues 
On review of summary judgmen1 orders, this Court employs same standard of review 
as the district court. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. S1evenson, Idaho 270, 272 (1994). 
CouJt reviews the record before the district comt, to de nova whether, after 
ccmstruing tht: facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there exists any genuint: 
issues of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of )a\v, 
Armand v. Opportunity Manogemenr Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 713 (2005); McColm-Traska v. 
Valley View, Inc., ~ 38 IdaJ:te 497, 500 (2003 ). Likewise, constitutional issues are pure questions 
of law over which exercises free review. Meisner v. Potlatch Co1p., 13] Idaho 
260 (1998). 
IL Facial Constitutional Challenges & Declaratory Judgment Actions 
a.11d IGWA take issue with district coun's consideration including 
the Director's use the Rules to avoid regulating anv connected junior priority water 
1ights 2005. As described below, the distrkt court properly considered thesE 
1) Jdaho Code § 67-5278(1) and this Court's decision in Asarco, v. Stare of 
Idaho, 138 Idaho 719 (2003) provjde an exception from the "exhaustion rule" 
a.11d allows a court to review an agency's "threatened application" of 
unconstitutional rules; and 
2) A factual foundation is necess3.ry for a court to review a 
challenge to administrative rnles. 
constitutional 
•The standard of review for discretionary actions made by the district court is briefed in t\.ie Plainriffi' Brief in 
Response to the City of Pocatello 's Opening Brief and is adopted for this response as well. The "Course of 
Proceedings I Statement of Facts" is also included Plaintiffs' response to 'Pocatello 's brief and is adopted herein. 
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Ll\ivs and regula1ions which are "clearly in violation of [a] constitutional principle'· are 
not valid. Moon v. Jnves1menr Bd., 96 ldaho J40, 143 (1974); Bradshaw v. Milner Low L(fi Jrr. 
Dist, i1?fra; 0 'Bryanr v. Ciry of Jdaho Falls, 78 Idaho 313, 325 (l 956) ("That which the 
constirution dire(.:tly prohibits may not be done oy indirection through a plan ... to evade the 
c:mstitutionru prohibition."). Generally speaking, constitution<il challenges are either "facial" 
challenges or "as applied" chailenges. 'Stare v. Korsen, 138 Jdahc 706, 712 (2003). 7 For facial 
challenges to a statute, a party must typically show "that no set of circumstances exist under 
v1hich tl-ie [R~es] would be valid." Moon v. North )do.ho Farmers Association, 140 Idaho 536, 
545 (2004).~ Dlls rule, however, does no1 preempt consideration of some facts, including an 
agency's "threatened application" of uni av.ful rules. Reviewing the fact the Director failed to 
distribute water in a timely and lav-rf'ul manner was relevan1 to demonstrate the "threatened 
application" of t!ie DeparrQent' s unconstitutionaJ Rules. Moreover, no after-the-facl 
administrmive review of the Director's .actions would ever cure the lack of timely watt;r 
<iistribution in 2005. 
1 In an "as applied" chaUenge, the Plaintiff mus: show that the slarutory or regulatory proYision~ were applied to a 
specific complainant in an unconstitutional manner. Korsen, 138 Jdabo at 7 I 2. Since the 1mderlying administrative 
ac!ion is still ongoing, nearly two years after the Plain!iffs frrsl requested administration, the district court 
dctennined tbat it would not addrcs~ any "as applied" challenge at this time. R. Vol. VllJ, P- l 813. The PlaimifJs 
presented cvidmce of another sit:iation wherein a senior water right hoider was unlawfully prejudiced by an 
application oflheR.ules. SeeR. Vol. JX, pp. 226-27, 230:S-23i3. Specifi:ally, the Plaintiffs addressed the 
Department's response 10 an administrative call, made on August 6, 2003, by Warren Lloyd, a senior grounci water 
user. This example did not involve the P:aimiffs' watcrrights. 
g nus rule neccssaiily req·~i.res the inrro:luction of certain hypothetical evidence of circumstances wherein the 
challenged prol'ision can/cannot be applied constinuionaJly. This is the case, no maner how abswd die hy?othetical 
circumstances may be. Yet, this i$ where 1he flaws in the Defendants' rind JGWA's arguments are exposed. 
According lo the D~fendants and iGWA, Plaintiff could argue that, h,iporheticalb• speaking. the Director could use 
the Rules 10 justify the !roplementation of an adminh.tra:ive process which precludes water de1ivery for years 
without enci.. However, a~ the same time, the foci that the Department has done that very thing is somehow 
inachnissible. The Defendants arguments are nothing more ilian an anempt to hide their unconsrirutional act1ons 
from the Court. 
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A. The Declaratory Judgment Statute Allows the CouH to Reyiew Some Facts 
Relative to its Analysis of the Validity of a Statute 
This Cowt :1.as that "some factual foundation of record" must be present in a 
faciai challenge. Moon, 140 Idaho at 545 ("Plaintiffs challenging ilie of a 
statu1e are required to provide 'some factual foundation of record' that contravenes The 
legislative findings") (emphasis added). Section 67-5278(1) allows a court to consider tbe 
agency to that point in time_ Tnis statute provides an exception to the general that a 
must first "exhaust" administrative remedies with the agency. 9 
Jn a declaratory judgment action, a plaintiff must only show that tbe statute or rule 
or allows, an agency to consider factors and empJoy procedures that are inconsistent 
with the Jdaho Constitution. See Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Board of Land 
Commissioners, 133 lda}io 64 (l 999) ("!WP"). Jn the plaintiffs challenged the' 
constitutionaJiry of J daho Code § 58-3 l OB, both facially and as a;.>>nn •• u 1-hrough a declaratory 
9 Tne exception was upheld this Coun in Asarco. J 28 Jdaho at 725 ("While the general rule is that a contestant 
must first exhaust administrative: remedies before filing a complaint m district oourt, there is an exception for 
decloru1oryjudgmr;ms regarding flgency rules.") (emphasis added). The Defendants fail to this 
Court's holding in Asarco, a case \\'here similar arguments were advanced hy a state agency in a.1 
a case on jurisdictional grounds. Jn ,1sarco, tJie Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) moved to 
case on exhaustion grounds claiming, the plaintiffs were required to take their challenge to the agency first. l 38 
Idaho al 722. This Court :;-ejected that argument. 
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judgmeni action. lt> Jd. at 65. In that case, the Cow1 examined the express language of the Jdaho 
Constitution and compared it to the criteria found in the challenged statute. li Id. at 66-68. 
!WP and section 67-5278 make clear thai (l) a constitutional chaJlenge may be brought in 
the form of a. declaratory judgment action, and (2) where the challenged statute or rule contains 
"permissive" language, the "no set of circumstances" standard will not opera1e to save the rnle 
from being declared facially unconstitmionaJ. In other words, tbe stan.dard is not applied in the 
traditional sense. 12 Indeed, the district court correctly recognized 'there is no bener evidence of 
the "threatened appl ication" of a rule than the actions already taken by the agency. R. Vol. Viil, 
pp. 1814-15. 
This notwithstanding, the Defendants and JGWA allege tha1 the district coUrt "invented a 
hybrid analysis for evaluating Plainti ffs ' claims." Defs. Br. at 40-42,. JGWA Br. ai 2. 13 ln 
addition to igrloring LC. § 67-5278, the Defendants misinterpret Korsen. ln Korsen, the lower 
courts did iiot examine the challenged statute "ns it applied to Korsen's specific conduct." 138 
Idaho at 712 (emphasis added). In fact, the "hybridized" analysis that this Court disappro,•ed of 
10AJthough the sta~te''s constiiotion~lity was challenged "zs applied," no facts were presented to indicate that 
anything other than a purely facial challenge was considered. This i~ particularly evidenl by !he foct that the Coun 
struck down the section as "unconstitutional" without any limitation as to any particular application of the statute. 
JWP, J 33 J daho at 68. 
11 The constirutional provision reviewed in !WP, Article IX,§ 8, requires that "monie> received from the sale or' 
lease of school endovnnent lands 'shall be reserved for school purposes only."' While the Constitution' requires t·he 
State to consider only the financial rcrum to the schools of the sale or lease of school endovm1e;:it lends, the Court 
fouoci th11t the challenged starute unconstinaionally allowed for cousideration of broader fmaocial impacts to the 
State. Jd. at 67-68. 
11 For example, given the use of such phrase; as "may be considered" and "include, but are no1 limited to," found in 
section 58-3 I OB, i\ would have been impossible for the JWP plaintiffs lo have succeeded in any facial chaUenge 
under the "no set of circumstances" standard. Yet, this Court found section 58-3 JOB to be facia Uy unconstirucional. 
i; Defendanls wrongly claim that thP. disnic: cour. transformed the purely legal question of the facial validiry of the 
Rules into a vehicle for litigating the Plaintiffs' es-applied claims and resolving disputed issues of fact". Si.nee the 
case was decided on .summar:.· judgmem, there were no "displlted issues of fact" to be resolved. 
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was a of facial validity. 
1 ~ According:y, the "hybrid anaJysis" 
arguments are flav"ed. 15 
Defendants further argue that section 67-5278 is nothing more than a "standing" and 
"ripeness" statute. Deft. at 44. This argument is also withou! merit. First, any that is 
hanned by facially u..11constitutional agency rules has standing. Likewise, since the statute allows 
parties to chaJJenge a regt1lation regardless of whether or not the agency has had such an 
opportunity, any ripeness argument is J.C. § 67 -527 8(3).) 6 
As demonstrated by thls Comi's holding m !WP, and, as properly recognized by the 
district court, a section 67-5278 declaratory action is not a traditional "facial" 
constitutional challenge and allows a district couri to some factual evidence. 
the district court correctly considered the application" of the Rules, i.e. 
1
' ! 38 Jdaho at 712 ("By the statute vague, 1101 as applied to Korsen 's conduct, bUl as 10 all applications on 
public propert)' alone, the and the district coun used an improper standard for ck:termining whether the 
statute was facially vague. II was to concl1Jde !hat the statute is invalid on its face as applied to public 
property, because the Standard 10 SUStain a facial challenge requires that B Statute be heJd imperrniss)b)y vague in al{ 
o[irs applications.") (emphasis added). 
r. That norwithstanding, this case is not like Korsen. The district coun here reviewed the Rules, as a whole. Tne 
diso-kt coun's review involved a thorough review of the constituticmal convention and other foundations for Idaho's 
water jaw, an in depth review of case law on the subject of prior appropriatlon and actual application of the Rules in 
other eases. There was no Korsen hybrid furthennore, frie examples presented by the Plaintiffs 
demonstrate the legal detects of the Rules on their face. Tne Defendants' misinterpretation of Korsen is no 
justification for their objection to the district court consideririg the facts of the unconstitutional water right 
administration scenarios that are possible, and that have acrually occurred, under the Rules. 
10 Finally, such an <lJ'gumen! is nonsensic~.J as it would require the cou11 to enteitain factuai evidence relative to 
standing and ripeness and then ignore that same evidence in order to review hypotheticaJ circumstances intended to 
suppor1 and/or defeat the regulations. Thfa is the case even i(. as the factual evidence provides glaring 
examples of the comtitutional ddiciencies of the regulations. 
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the a::t1ons of the Direclor already taken in responding to Lli.e Plaintiffs' reques~ for 
administra:ion, as well as other proceedings, in reviewing the Rules' conS!itutionalit)'. 11 
B. Plaintiffs' Challenge to the Rules Still Meets the "No Set of Circumstances" 
Standard. 
Assuming that the aforementioned standard applies, the Plaintiffs meet the "no set of 
circumstances" rule for a typical facial constitutional challenge. As the distiict cour\ recogrijzed, 
the Constitution affords senior water rights certain constitutional protections. 1 ~ The Rules usurp 
those protections and unlawfully require the senior appropriator to run an adminisc-ative 
gaunt}et, the end result of which is, tha1 the seruor must continue to go without needed water 
until all contested cases (including appeals) have been resolved. 19 Since the Rules flip the prior 
appropriation doctrine on its head, they are unconstitutional i11 every possible situation, 
regardless of whether the senior appropriator uses surface water or grou11dwater.20 
17 n)e Defendants wrongly claim the districl coun eJTed in failing to dismi~~ the "as applied'' claim~. De/s. Br. at 
46-47. Section 67-5278(1) and Auwco provide an express exception to the general "~xhaustion rule" when a pariy 
challcng~~ the V<llidity of an agency rule. The Defendants' reliance upon Owsley v. Id oho Jndus. Comm 'n, l 4 l 
!daho 129 (200), is inapposite since that case did not involve a ch:illenge 10 an agency's rules but involved the 
lndust:ial Commission's denial of injured work en;' sen:Jemem~. i 4 l Jdaho al l 32. Even so, the Owsley Coun 
acknowledged thr.rc are exceptions to the "exiiaustion rule". See id. 
Here, Plaintiffs' challenge falls within the exception set forth in LC.§ 67-5278. Moreover, since the 
Department had no jurisdic:tior. to detenninc COllstitutional gues1ions, Plaintiffs did exhaust their adminislrative 
remedies. Jdaho Slore Ins. F1111dv. Van Tine, 132 ldaho 902, 908 (1999). 
Finally, thi~ Court should take note of the Defendants' statements to the district coUJt on the "as applied" 
c'aims. In seeking c~rtification of the judgment for appeal, the Defendant~ r~presented that the "as applied" claims 
were moot. Tr. Vol. J, p. :)40, L J 2-16, p. 350, L. 14-l 8, p. 351, L. 23-25. Jn a turnabout with this Cour., the 
Defendants now assert Plaintiffs' ·•as applied" claims are not ''moot'' and thal this Court should remand 1he case 
with instructions to dismiss those claim~. De/s. Br. 46-47. The Defendants cannot represent that pan of a case is 
"moot'·' in order to receive a speedy appeal of;: decisjon they don't like and then a1 the same tim~ seek to have that 
pa'1 of the case dismissed through the appeal. Such tactics are the type of"piecemeal" appeals thai Rule 54(b) 
prohibits. If \oe claims are not ''moot" as argued by the Defendanis in this appeal, and the district court's decision is 
reversed, then they remain before the diStrict cour1. 
is Order at 90, 94, l 17, 124. 
'~ Tht .Rules also result in an unlawful diminishmeot and taking of a senior's prjor decreed right 
J~ The Rules are also uncoDStirutional in administration between ground water rights. Seep. 4, n. 7, supra. 






















IIJ. Notwithstanding the Standard ufRe,•iew Applied by the District Court, this Court 
can Affirm on Alternate Grounds. 
Even if, this Court finds tl1at the standard of by the distric 
court was improper, this Court should still affIDT;. :Uecisions regarding motions for summary 
judgment and constitutional are re11iewed de novo. See Armand, 14 j Idaho at 713; 
Meisner, 13 J Jdabo at 260. "[w]hen a judgment on the correct 
conclusion, but employs reasoning to that of t1iis Comi, v,ie may affirm the judgment on 
alternate grnunds." Martel v. Bulotri, J 38 Idaho 451, 454-55 (2003). Accordingly, since, the 




The Rules unlawfully diminish a water priority and create a system 
that ensures water is . . ' h '2 to JU.DJ ors, not senior;;:, ~irst.- the face of a water shortage, 
senior appropriators cannot rely upon a watennaster to and distribute water under their 
2
j This is not 10 state tha1 the standard ofreview is not important. However, the extremely ti:ne sensitive 
nature ofthese proceedings as illustrated by this Court's order placing the matter on the expedited calendar and the 
fact the Rules have been challenged in various district courts affinnation is appropria;e regardless of this 
Coun's ruling on the standard of review. See Martel, l 38 Idaho at 454-55. 
Furthennore, to use a "standard of review" theory to defer a ruling on the merits of the case is not in the 
interests of the panies and does not forth er the policy of judicial economy. Since all admi1 this case presents 
a question of great importance for purposes of water right administration in this Court should render a 
final decis!OL See e.g, Bogert v. Kin;;: er, 93 ldaho 515, 5 J8 (1970) ("In a case of such wide and ·extreme pllbllc and 
governmental imponance, questions of technicality and methodology should, if possible, be laid aside and the 
decision of this Court be dispositive oftlie ultimate issue-"). 
22 tlie Director is authorized ro promulgate ruies and regulations, such rules must be "in acco:·dance with 
the priorities of the. rights ofrhe users therof." l.C. § 42-603. Since the Rules, a5 explained throughout L'lis brief, 
violate tht Idaho Constitution and water distribution slatutes, the district court correctly found that the Director ac1ed 
outside his statutory authoriry in promu1gating the Rule;;. Order at 125. 
TN RESPONSE TO ' & IGWA'S BRIEFS 9 
J 
I 'j 













; _ 1 
I ' 
l l - ) 
l '. 





I , ..... 
' I 
rights. Instead, rhey musi initiate administrative "contested cases'·, demonstrate why 
adminis;ration is necessary, and repeatedly justify their diversion and use under a previously 
decreed 1ight. The resul ting system of administration does not, as recogni zed by this Cou11 in 
A&B hr Dist. v. Jdaho Conservation League, "deal with the rights on the basis of 'prior 
approp1iation' in the event cf a call as required.'' 131 lda.ho 411, 422 ( J 998), 
Aft.er a careful revjew of the constitution and its history, the relevant statutes, and this 
Court's precedent defini:Jg the protections afforded a senior water right, the distlic.1 court rightly 
declared the Defendants' Ruies unconstitutional. This CoUJ"1 should affirrn. 
II. Summary of the Plaintiffs 1 Case Before the District Court 
As t11e Defendants and JGW.A continue to mischaracterize the Plaintiffs' position, a brief 
summary is necessary. A water right is a property right that the Defendants are constitutionally 
required to administer in accordance with the doctrine of "firs! in time, first in right." Such 
adm)nistration forbids treating every water right as a creature of equal status, but instead, in 
times of scarcity, demands timely delivery of water to an older, senior right to the detriment of a 
newer, junior right "even if harsh and unjust." Kirk v. Bartholomew, 3 Jdabo 367 (J 892). The 
timely deliveT)' sought by' Plaintiffs to sen•ice their senior water iignts must occur, as succinctly 
set out by the district court, when the fields are "green;" that is, "consistent with the exigencies 
of a growing crop during an irriga1.ion season"23 Order at 93. Moreover, administration that is 
2' Any argument~ 10 the contrary fail 10 comp1ehend t:he realities of frriga1ion in an arid state like ldaho. The 
Defendants misinterptet Ark.oosh in r::is ;egard. See R. Vo!. l.)(, p. 2256 for fw1her discussion . 
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not timely effects a taking of the propeny right. 24 Such a deprivation is nol redressable through 
furt.l-ier "after-the-fact" administrative review. Finally, a water right decree or iicense defines the 
amount of water right to be protected and is not subject to r:e-in(erpretation by !he Department or 
its Director. 
Plaintiffs did 1wr a:gue, as incorrectly represented by the Defendants: 
t'l-iat Idaho law requires immediate and automatic cwtailment of junior ground 
water rights any time a senior surface water right holder's water supply dips 
below the decreed quantity, without regard to the extent of hydraubc 
interconnection between the surface and ground water supplies, the effect of 
junior ground water diversions on the senior right, tbe extent of the senior's 
cunent needs, or any other relevant principal of the prior appropriation 
doctrine as established by Idaho Jaw. 
De.fs. Br. at 6. Plaintiffs are not seeking to "shut down" all groW1dwater use on tbe ESP A. 
Rather, Plainiiffs seek proper adrninistrarion to protect their water rights from unlawful 
interference by out-of-priority diversions.25 
lnstead of addressing foe true arguments in their briefs, the Defendarits and J GW A waste 
most of their briefing ineffectively shadow boxing a phantom argument of their own creation. 
As a result, they fa.ii to address the Plaintiffs' reaJ contention - tha; senior water rights be given 
the protections afforded by Jdaho's constitution and.water distribution statutes and adminhtered 
accordingly. The Rules seek to unlawfully change these rights. 
2
• This Coun has recognized that to duninish a senior's priori!)' by taking water rhat would othe1wise br available 
for his diversion and use, results in an ''injury" to the senior's wat~ right. See Jenkins'" Srare Dept. qf Water 
Resources, 103 Jdaho 384, 388 (1984); Lockwoodv. F1·eeman, ) 5 Jdaho 395, 398 (1908). 
~~ Jf a junior wa1er right holder contends thar his right does not injure ihe senior water right, that there is waste or 
that curtailing the junior will not supply wateno the senio; (i.e. a fu rile call), then the junior mus\ prove such by 
clear and convincing evidence. 









III. The District Cour1 Correctly Found That Idaho's Constitution and Water 
Distribution Statutes Require ,Juniors, Not Seniors, to Pro,•e They May Divert 
Water in Times of Shortage. 
underlying theory or premise of the prior appropriation doctrine is that he who 
appropriates a supp!y of water to a beneficial use is first in right" Order al 73. The 
coun' s statement is grounded in ldabo law and the must admiruster the State's 
water resources, ground water, according to priority. bedrock principie of Ida110 
water Jaw that guarantees senior appropriators have foe "better agains1 juniors has not 
wavered since 1881. This Court has consistently reaffirmed this guiding principle that has 
protected property rights and provided certainty and stability to the regulation Idaho's water 
resources. 26 In its most basic terms the prior appropriation doctrine requires senior water 
rights to be satisfied prior to junior water rights, as noted by the distr:ic1 coU11 is 
in ~'clear and terms" are required to protect • -1.. • • • h 2"i ng.JJts m times o, s. 011age. 
26 SeeSilke)'"· Tiegs, 5) Jdaho 353 (1931) ("a valid appropriation first made under either method will have 
priority over a subsequent va:id appropriation"); Be~cher v. Cassia Creek Irrigation Co., 66 Jdaho l, 9 (J 944) ("It is 
the unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction t'iat priority of appropriation shall give the better right between those using 
the water."); Nertleron v. Higginson, 98 ldabo 87, 9J (19TT) ("it is obvious that in times of water shortage someone 
is no1 going to receive water. Under the appropriation system the righl of priority is based on the date of one's 
appropriation; Le. firs! in 1ime is first in 
2 Jdahti's water distribution stannes (l.C. §§ 42-602, 607) do not require a senior to make a call" in order 
to receive the benefit of Jav>'ful water administration. The SR.BA Court recognized the same io its Basin Wide 5 
Order: 
lmplicit in the efficient administration of water rights is the recognition that a senior should no1 
be required to reson to making a delivery call against competing junior rights in times of 
shonage in order to have the senior right satisfied. The idabo Supreme Coun made this 
pointedly clear in the Musser case. 
R. \/oL JV, p. 798. This duty of the Director and its watermasters is ftffther heightened when they have 1cnr1w11~rw 
of a depleted Waler supply and the fact seniors' water rights are unfulfillerl. Seep. 1, n. I, supra. 









r .. , 
l I i 
' 1. 
,. -




I i u 
11 
j -· i 
J 
J _: 
I • . 
I 
_J .. 
J.C. § 42-607; see R. T.. }/ccha.t Co. Hv.!er, J 14 Jdaho 23, 27 (Ct. App. : 988). T!lis Cour1 has 
similarly held tba1 the Director's affim1ative obligation to administe; wa1er rights within a water 
distJ1ct by priori1y is a "clea:r legal duty." Musser v. Higginson, l 25 Jdaho 392, 395 {) 994). is 
Given the constitutional preference for senior water lights, junior water rights must 
therefore oe cunailed in times of shortage unless the junior can prove, by "clear and convincing 
. . 
evidence", that :,is diversion and use of water does not injure a senior appropriator. Moe v. 
Harger, l 0 Idaho 302, 305 (J 904).29 This Courr has reaffirmed constitutional protection 
afforded seniors on several occasions.30 
These standards apply equally to water rights diverting from co_nnected tributary 
)J sources: Accordingly, since all watei in the Snake River Basin is deemed hydraulically 
22 Jdaho' s prior appropriation sy~1em provides cenainty 10 a senio: water right boider who is "entitled 10 presume 
that the wa1cnnas1er is deliveiing v:ater ... in compliance wi1h this governing decree" and that bis wa1erri~ht 
"consists of more lhan the mere right 10 a lawsuit against an interfering wate.r user." A/mo Warer Co.'" Darringron, 
95ldaho16, 21 (1972) (emphasis added). 
iY Contrary 10 JGWA 's interpretation (JG WA Br. Al 19), the rrial court iD Moe entered a decree dete:mi.ning the 
water right~ io the Big Losi River along with an injunction to prevent the junior appropria1ors from diveoring water 
that evenrually nowed underground and reappeared for diversion and use by senior appropriators downsrrcam. J 0 
ldaho at 305-307. The incorporation of the injunction into the decree wa$ affirmed. See id. a1 :>06. There was no 
"jury trial" before administration, and the decree wa~ found to be the "fina: word" for water distribution on the river. 
' 0 See Cantlin '" Coner, &8 Jdaho J 79. l 86 (I 964) ("A subsequent appropriato:- anempting to justify his diversion 
has the burden of proving that it will not injure prior appropriations); Silk.e)• ''· Tiegs, 54 Jdaho i 26, l 29 (I 934) 
("adherence to rule requiring protection of the prior appropriator, precludes relief to [the junior ground water 
user)"); Jacfaon v. Cowait, 33 ldaho 525, 528 (l 92 I) ("The burden of proving thai (the water) did not reach the 
reservoir w~ upon the appellants ... and this they fail 10 do"). 
~ 1 ln Josslyn v. Da6•, the Court he.id: 
ll seems self tvidem that to oiverl water from a stream or its supplies or tributaries must in a 
large measure dimiJ:1ish the volume of water in the main srream, and where an appropriator 
seeh 10 divert water on 1he grounds thar it does not diminish the volume in the main 5tream or 
prtjudice a prior appropriator, he should, as we o·oserved in Mo: v. Harger, l 0 Jdaho 305, 77 
Pac. MS, produce "clear and convincing evidence showing thai the prior approp1iator would 
not be injured or affected by tne diversion," The burden is on him to show such facts. 
J5 Idaho 137, J49 (1908) 
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connected,31 administration of jupjor priotity ground water iights in the ESPA is necessary to 
prevenl interference v.~th senior swface water rights to the Snake River and its tributary springs. 
In short, a senior appropriator is en1i1led 10 have his water right protec1ed from 
in1e1ference by junior appropriators, and the Department has a "c:ear legal duty" to djstribute 
water on that basis. 3~ The district court rightJy found that these "concepts arise out of the 
Constitution" and constitute ''incorporeal propeiiy rights," vested in the senior appropriator, that 
must be respected·artd upheld. Order p. 76, 77. 34 The protection is required whether it is against 
a surface water user attemptLrig, to divert water out-of-priority up river or a well owner tbat 
accomplishes the same effect by pwnping tributary groundwater. 
The district court correctiy determined .that the Department's Rules fl ip the law of prior 
appropriation on its head by fai ling to incorporate constitutional tenets regumng: (J) a 
r; 
presumption of injury in times of shortage; (2) the burden on the junior to claim iack of injury by 
clear and convincing evidence; (3) objective standards for review; and 4) the Director to honor 
prior decreed and licensed water rights. Order at 79, 81 . 90-91 The above principles are 
;i The exception to this presumption is limired to circumstances where iin individual c]aimanl proves to the SRBA 
Court rhat the source of his water righ1 is "separa:e" from the rest of the Basin. The general provision from the 
Basin-Wide 5 case provides the peninent languirge. O;der at 69. Uniess.a water righ1 js deemed to derive from a 
"separate sow·ce", it must be adrninis1ercd together wi:.h all other rights in tbe basin under lhe "connected sources" 
general provision. 
;; lDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3; J.C. §§ 42-602, 607; Musser, 125 Jdaho at 395. 
;• These constitutional rights and protections afforded senior appropriators are far more than simply "procedures," as 
characterized by lhe Defendant~. Su Deft. Br. at 22. Moreover, Defendants' reliance upon Stale v. Griffith, 97 
Jdaho 52 (J975) is misplaced. Griffith concerned a defendam·s appeal ofa district court's decision to reject his 
request for another "trial de novo" of his conviction. 97 Jdaho at 54. The defendani received one jury trial before 
the magistrate and was not entitled rn another one before the disnict court. Jd at 57-58. No constinnional rights 
were denied. See id. Here, on rh~ other hand, the Defendants' Rules directly conflict wirh the constitution's "first in 
1ime, firsl in right" m<>ndate and fail to give effect to the necessary protections afforded senior rights. 
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'·integral to the constitutiona! protections accorded warerrights" and "'give lbc primary effect and 
vah.ie to 'first in time, first in righl."' Order at 90, 94.3s 
JV. The District Court Properly Determined That the Rules V5o]ate the Constitution 
and Water Distriblltion Statutes By Failing to Incorporate Necessary Components 
of Jdaho 1s Prior Appropdstion Doctrine. 
The Defendants oversimplify the district court's decision as simp)y finding the Rules 
void due to missing "procedural components." Defs. Br. at 6, 23-2.5. The Defendants even 
anempt to justify the RuJes by arguing that these tenets and proceclures are "incorporated by 
reference" or lhat the Director could "fill in the gaps" with "existing law." Id. On the contrary, 
these components, including the required burdens of juniors, objective standards for 
administration, and the need to complete admi."1istration during an irrigation season, are not. 
simply "procedures" to be left to the whim of administrative officials and their subjective 
interpretations of agency rules. Rather, they are crucial for constitutional water distribut)on. As 
correctly found by the ciistrict :::ourt, the Rules' failure to expressly ideni.ify these components is 
fatal. 36 
A. Rllles 30, 40, and 41 UnlawfuHy Force Seniors ("Petitioners))) to 1nitiate and 
Prove \Vhy Aclro.inistration is Necessary During Times of Shortage. 
~~The Defendrm~ shrug off these consnrntional shortcomings; instead claiming that judicial review of the Director'$ 
"decision" in water right administration:~ sufficient to protect water right holders. De.fr. Br. at 23. Defendants fai! 
to understand that initiating and completing a ''.judicial review" proceeding (month$ or ye<'.n later) of a Director·~ 
unconstinllional scheme of water right administrarion fails to provide the necessal)' re-rnedy, wate~. panicularly 
when that water is necessary for irrigation purposes ro satisfy a growing crop. 
~6 The district coun' s decision regarding «he unlav.ful exemption of "'domestic" and "stockv,·atcr" water rights was 
correct as well. Order at l 03-J 08. Neither the Defendants nor JGWA take issue with this pan of the coun's 
d1;:cision. See Deft. Br. at i3; !GWA Br. at J. Accordingly. the Defendants'' failure t.O raise the issue in their 
opening brief, without any argument, is dlspositive and the district coun's decision must be affinned. Myers v. 
l·Vorbnon 's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508 (2004) {"In order to be considered by this Cou!1, <he appellant is 
required to identify legai issues and proYide authorities supporting the argumcntS in the opening brief. l.A.R. 35 .... 
Consequently, 'this Cou~ will no1 consider argument$ raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief ... '"). 









The Rules reverse "first in time, first in ;ight" by forcing seniors to make a "delivery 
call" arld proceed through administrative "contested cases" before any administration occurs. 
This "last in time until determined otherwise" doctrine pem)eates the Rules and inoerently 
protects junior prioijry ground water rights. The three different regulatory scenmos in Rules 30, 
40, and 4l all place foe same bmclens on seniors. Then, while a senior suffers through the 
administrative gauntlet at great expense and delay, junior priority ground water users are free to 
deplete the senior's water supply without consequence. 
Rule 30, dealing with hydrau!icaliy connected junior ground water rignts located outside 
the boundaries of a water clistrict, forces a senior to begin a "contested case" by filing a 
"petition." 37 Rule 30. Furthermore, according to Rule.30, the senior, or "petitioner," canies U-ie 
burden of FOving "material injury." Remarkably. no action is taken against junior ground water 
users until the Direc1or issues an order "folJo\>.ring considerarion of rhe contested case. "38 Rule 
30.07. ln the meantime, juniors are permined to continue diverting a senior's water. 39 In the 
example of a Rule 30 call made by a senior groundwater user in August 2003, the Department 
denied the request for administration (two years later in Jan?ary 2005) on 1he basis ~e senior 
"did not prove, by preponderance of the evidence tha1 pumping by junior water· right holciers 
;i Under 1he Department's procedural rules, a petitioner must: J) fully state the facts upon which the pee it ion is 
based, 2) refer ~o 5tatu1es. roles, or other law u_oon which the petition is based, 3) state th~ relief desired, and 4) state 
the name of the person petitioned against. R. Vol. JV, p. 84& (JDAPA 37.0l.Oi .230). 
>t Altbougll the Defendants allege that ldzho's legislative scheme for water right administration replaced the 
"prac:tice of admin!srration-by-lawsuit", they fail to explain how Rule 30' s "contested ca~e" process is any differe111 
or why "adminisrrntive lawsuits" are acceptable. Defi. Br. at 22. Moreover, being forced to fiic a petition and serve 
approximately 3,000 junior priority ground water righu, as was the case with Plaintiffs., can hardly be characterized 
as a "mini-lawsuit''. R. Ex 4, Creamer Ajf. Ex. D (Order at 33). 
39 \Vhereas ldabo's prio; appropriation doc;rioe requires 8 junior to justify his use bef(lli; being allowed 10 take water 
from a ~ource, Ruic 30 rums that constitutional protection upside down. 







caused to his water iight'. and ··aid not prove that his diversion and use of water is 
Vol. IX, p. 23J3. Clearly, the process vio}ates Tdaho'.s law of 
• ' 40 appropnat1on. See Canrlin, 88 Idaho at J 86 (a junior "has the burden of proving" lack of 
injury). 
Similarly, Rule 40 precludes administration ·within organized water district;:, until a 
files a "delivery "alleging" he is suffering "material injury." Rule 40. Furthermore, like 
Rule 30, only occurs "upon a finding by the Director as provided in Rule 42 that 
material inju.-y is Rule 40.0J, Contrary to the constitutio.:.ial presumption of 
injury to a the rule places the burden on the senior to demonstrate he 
is suffering "material before any adrninistration occurs.41 On jts face, Rule 40, like: Rule 
by forcing seniors to initiate admi..Pjstration and carry the 
burder1 of demonstrating while juniors are left to divert. 
of junior ground water within a ground water management area. Under this rule, 
the senior, or "petitioner", is to "submit all information ... on which the claim is based 
that the water supply is ir1sufficient." Rule 41.0J .a. The n.J.le then reguires the Director to hold a 
"fact-finding hearing•· at some point in time sc:njor and an)' "respondents" can present 
evidence on the water supply the of ground water. Rule 41.01.b. Tne :Jirecto;-
then "may" deny the petition, grant the or find the water supply is insi.:fficie:-it to meet 
'
0 Jn addition, "contested cases" under t.'ie Departmenr's procedural rules provide for discovery, motion practice, and 
posi-hear:ing appeal pro:esses. R Vol. IV, p 837·871. Clearly, thro:igh a fom:ial "contested case", like 
a lawsuit, takes rime a'ld i~ certain 10 extend beyond an irrigation season when administration is required. 
41 R. Ex. 4, CreamerAjf., Ex.D (February 14, 2005 Order at3J, ~38, and at 34). 
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1he demands of water rights v,~thin all or a portion of the ground \vater management area and 
order water right holders on a time priority basis to cease or reduce withdrawal of water. Rule 
41.02.c. Once again, seniors, as the "petitioners", carry rhe burden.
42 
The Rules unlawfully shift the burden of proving injury and the need for administralion 
onto the senior approp1iator. As such, seniors are left to initiate a series of "contested cases" and 
prove t.1-iey are suffering "material injury" before the Director and the watermasters will take any 
action. The result is a lack of water to seniors, while juniors continue to divert unabated. Such a 
system does not provide efficient and immediate administration as required by the Idaho 
Constitution and water distribution statutes, I.C. §§ 42-602, 607. Moreover, the Rules' "after-
the-fact" adminis1rative scheme forces seniors to endure extraordinary costs and burdens in order 
to receive proper water right adm1nistration.43 
The Rules' water distribution scheme violates the constitution and "injures" a senior 
\'-'at er right holders by denying them use of their vested property rights without due process. See 
42 Although a ground water management area designation signals that the water supply is "approaching tbe 
conditions of a critical ground water area", the rule still places the burden on the senior to initiate and prove why 
administration is necessary. l.C. § 42-233b. The rule plainly conn-adicts what is happening in the subject aquifer 
since the g;-ound water supply is not secure and the basin is deemed to be approaching a state of"not having 
sufficient ground water to provide a reasonably safe supply for irrigation of cultivated fields ... " l.C. § 42-233a. 
Despite the statutory precautions, Rule 41 allows the Director to deny a senior water right holder's request for 
priority administration and pennitjuniors to continue to diven unabated while a senior suffers the shortage. The Jaw 
does not give the Director "discretion" to deny water distribution to senior water right holders when connected 
junior water right holders <rre diverting and taking water that would otherwise be available for the senior's use. 
Finally, Ruk 4 J purports to allow the Director, when ordering right holders on a rime priority basis, "to consider the 
expected benefil~ of ar; approved mitigation plan in making such finding." Jd. Nothing in Jdaho's ground wate;-
management area statute, LC. § 42-233b, gives the Director any authority to consider "expected benefits" of a 
"mi1igation plaJ!" if there is insufficient water lo meet t'ie demands of all water rights within the management area. 
On its face, Rule 4 l does not comport with LC. § 42-607, or the ground water management area statute, J.C. § 42· 
233b, and therefore mus1 be decl<rred void as a matter of law and set aside. See Roeder Holdings, LLC v. Bom·d of 
Equali:::arion of Ada Cou11ry, J 36 Jdaho 809, 813 (2001 ). 
~ 3 See Appendix B to Defs. Br. (example of Plaintiffs' administrative case identified at that poL-1t in time as 
proceeding for J 6 months) . 
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Jenk.ins, I 03 Idaho a\ 388; Loc·kwood, 1 5 ldaho al 398. Accordingly, the distric1 com~ correctly 
declared the Rules invalid as a matter of law for violating the plain teims of Jdaho's constirution 
and water distribution statutes. 44 This Cou;-t should affi1m. 
B. The Rules Fail to Establish a Workable Procedural Framework for Timely 
Water Right Administration. 
Water distribution mu.st be "timely'' in order to have a meaningful and practical effect for 
those that use the water, particularly those entities and individuals that rely upon water for 
irrigation. T11e distric1 court correctly recognized the "timeliness" factor and its constitutional 
history: 
in order to give any meaningful constirutiona] protections to a senior water right, a 
delivery call procedure must be completed consistent with the exigencies of a 
growing crop during an irrigation season ... [t)he concept of time being of the 
essence for a water supply for irrigation rights is one of the primary basis for the 
preference system in [w.'ie] Constirution." 
Order a1 93. See Arkoosh v. Big Wood Canal Co., 48 Jdaho 3S3 ( J 930) .. 
J GWA wouJd have this Court ignore the timeliness requirement. J GW A wrongly claims · 
that resolution of a delivery caD need only "be completed wit~in a reasonable time consistent 
with due process and the complexity of the issues al hand" and that the "water administra1ion 
staruies also are silent aboi..li. timing." JGWA Br. al 16. Of course the longer the delay, the more 
water a junior caJ1 divert ou!-of-prioriry under the Rules.45 Contrary to JGWA and the Rules, 
-------·· ···- - -
'"See Evans v. Andn1s, 124 ldaho 6, JC (l 993)("0ur duty is 10 follow and give effect to the plain and unambiguous 
language of the Constitu\ion ."): Roeder, J 36 Jdaho at 8 J 3 ("When a conflict exists between a starme aod a 
regulation, the regulation m'.lsi be se1 aside to the extent of the conflict."). 
45 Similar to the flaws in the Rule~, JGWA' s "reasonabie" time standard is not objective and provides no certain!)' 
that a senior will receive water during t:he irrigation season. Obviously this would benefil junior prioriry ground 
water rights. 

















c .. J 
however, ldabo law requires dislribution to occur "in times of scarcity of water . . so to do in 
order to supply the prior rights." J.C. § 42-607. 
"Times of scarcity" denotes any time during the inigation season when the water supply 
is not sufficient to supply aJ.l the rights on a source or during the non-irrigation season when 
sufficient water does not accrue to fill senior rights. Delaying a decision on water right 
administration i;-idefinitely or to wha.tever time is deemed "reasonable" to the Director plainly 
contradicts the law. 46 When a senior irrigator needs the water, and the vehicle of "contested 
cases" delays administration beyond the time when the water would have been diverted and 
used, it is obvious L.1-ie process wi11 not comport with Idaho's prior appropriation doctrine. 
The Defendants assert that the "informal resolution" process under Rules 30 aI1d 41 and 
the Director's May 2005 "emergency relief' order under Rule 40 comply with the lav.''s "timely 
administration" requirement. Defs. Br. at 26. Yet, what if the Director rejects a senior's regues1 
for "infonnai resoju1ion~', as was the response the Plaintiffs received in early 2005?47 \ilhen the 
Director refoses to "infonnally" resolve a rcques1 for administration, a senior has no choice but 
to proceed through the formal "contested cases" before administration occurs. The delays in 
such cases are weli docume!'lted and inevitable given their L'litigation" nature. Tne process 
~ 6 1n addition, the ·'phased-in" curtailment provision fr1Ruic40.0J.a further unlawfully delays administration by 
allowing juniors to curtaii over a period of up to five years, while the senior must continue to suffer the shortage in 
the interim. The "phased-in" cmtailment provision is another example of how the Rules violate the constitution. 
This issue was addressed i?J the briefing before the disnict cou:-t. R. Vol. V, pp. J 2 l 3-J 2J 5; Vol. VJJ, pp. 1903-906. 
"
7 R. Ex. 4, Creamer Ajf., Ex. D (February 14, 2005 Ord~r at 33). Plaintiffs are unaware of any conjunctive 
administration case that has ever been decided under "infonna] resolution" procedures. The Defendaots' claim that 
"infonnal procedures" are available under the Rules is a hollow promise since in realit)' such a prncess is never 
used. 
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'provided by the Rules does not accord with ensuring timely water right administration, 4 t The 
district court correctly dete1mined such a failure was constitutionally deficient. This Court 
sbould affirm. 
V. The District Court Correctly Found That the Rules Effect an Unlawful "Re-
Adjudication'i of Senior Water Rights. 
Court decrees are conclusive and are not subject to re-exai-nination under the guise of 
administration.49 Since the Rules permit the Director to ignore elements of decieed and licensed 
water rights and force a seruor to re-prove and justify h1s use through various "determinations" 
under Rules 20, 40, and 42, they plainly violate Jdaho law. 
A. A \Vater Right Decree is "Conclusive') to the HNature and Extent" of That 
Right and the Director is Bound to Honor the Decree in Administration. 
The Defendants and JGWA misconstJue the effect and purpose of adjudications. The 
SRBA is not simply an exercise to catalog and list water rights in the Snake River Basin. The 
code specifically charges the Direcror to "commence an examination of the water system, the 
canals and ditches and other works, and the uses behzg made of wafer dive1ted from the water 
system for \Vater rights acquired under state Jaw." I.C. § 42-1410(1) (emphasis added). The 
•t As for the Director's May 2005 "emergency order", the Defendants fail to mention that no "relief" was ever 
acrually provided during the 2005 irrigation season (except for 435 acre-feet of reach gain, R. Vol. I, p. 51). Indeed, 
the order purposely delayed a "final" decision until some undefined later date: "The Director will make a final 
detennination of the amounts of mitigation required and actually provided after the final accounting for surface 
water diversions from the Snal:e River for 2005 is complete." R. Vol. J, p. 204 (May 2, 2005 Order at 4 7, ~ j I). 
This so-called "final" determination did not occur until weli after the 2005 irrigation season and was even at that 
point subject to further revision by the Director. R. Ex. 5, n1ird Rassier Alf., Ex. H. Although the Director 
determined injury occurred in 2005, no water was provided to mitigate that injury during 2005. Tne resulting 
"comested case" and so-called "emergency relief' provided by the Director was meaningless. 
49 The same rule applies to licenses issued by the Department since by Jaw the license cannot ref)ect ~an amount in 
excess of the amount that has been beneficially applied." J.C. § 42-219. Like a decree, after a Llcense is issued it is 
"binding upon" the Department and Director for purposes of administration. LC. § 42-220. 
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Director must "evaluate the extent and nature of each water right", whicb the 
"authority io go upor. all public and private" and inspect buildings or structures 
that may house a "well or divers.ion works." LC.§ 42·1410(2) (emphasis The Director 
then recommends the water right to the court based upon his investigation. J.C. § 42-l 4J 1. 
Accordingly, a court decree of the "the nature and extent of the water is considered 
" I.C. §§ 42-1412(6), 1420(1); see also, Crow v. Carlson, J07 Jdabo 461, 465 
(1984) is conclusive proof of diversion of the water, a.'1d of application of foe water to 
beneficial use"). Moreover, in applying for a water right, a water user must prove he has not 
ta.ken more water than needed for the intended beneficial purpose. Drake v. Earhart, 2 ldaho 
750 (1890). 5° Furthennore, he cannot waste or the wa.ter so as to deprive others of the 
quantity for which be does not have actual use. 
This Courr recognized that beneficial and reasonable use is detennined wben a water 
righ1 is decreed in Head v. Merrick: 
69 Idaho l 
Water rights are valuable property, and a claimant seeking a decree of a court 
to confirm his Jight to use water by appropr)ation must present to tbe 
court sufficient evidence to enable it to make definite and certain findings as 
to the amount of water actually diverted and applied, as well as the amount 
neceSSa?J1 for the beneficial use for which the water is claimed. 
l 08 (1949) (emphasis added). 
in Jdaho, as in ot}1er prior appropriation stales, beneficial use is the measure 
a water and is a sett] ed terrn of the decreed right. The reasonableness on and 
50 See C1!so, Farmers' Co-op Ditch Co. v. Riverside Jrrigation Disl., 16 J daho 525, 535-36 (l 909) rnust be 
required and demanded in the use and application of water.); Abbo111·. Reedy, 9 Idaho 58J (J 904) (the law only 
allows the appropriaror the amount acrually necessary for the useful Oi beneficial purpose to wblch he appjies i1). 
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use is proved \vhen the water right is adjudicated and it becomes resfudicaw upon entry of the 
decree. If a decree's tenns may be disregarded in administration, then the pmpose of an 
adjudication, like the 20-yea.r Snake River Basin Adjudication, is rendered meaningless. 
Since a decree is "conclusive" as to the "extent and nature" of a water right, the Director 
has no authority to .refuse to distribute water in priority u11rler the theory the senior may not 
"need" the water on a particular day when it happens to rain or in a year wbere the senior 
happens to grow a less consumptive crop. 51 Although a water right is still subject to "forfeiture" 
or "abandonment" after it is decreed, a righ1 cannot be reduced under a subjective "reasonable 
beneficial use" finding in adrnini strati on. 
This Court firmly rejected such "microma..'lagement" of water rights in State v. Jlagennan 
FVater Right Owners, Inc.: 
follo\~fog that decision and during the course of the proceedings before the 
special master, the ID\VR stated that the Director's recommendation was based 
on current non-application to "reasonable beneficial use." The JDWR stated 
that the concept of beneficial use allows/or constant re-evaluation of 
whether the water is being used beneficially . ... 
The special master determined that absent a claim of forfeiture, abandonment, 
adverse possession, or estoppel, a reduction f.n beneficial use after a water 
right vests is not a basis upon which a water right may be reduced . ... 
Aithough the doctrine of beneficial use is a concept that is constitutionally 
recognized and that permeates Idaho's water code, the Idaho Constitution does 
IZOt mandate that non-application to a beneficial use, for any period of time 
no matter lzow small, results in the loss or reduction of water rights. 
J 30 ldabo 736, 738-39 (i 997) (emphasis added). 
51 Such analyses are prohibited under Idaho law for the Department "cannot limii 'rhe extent of beneficial use of the 
water right' in the sense oflimiting how much (of a crop) can be produced from fue use of that right." R. Vol. IV, p. 
933. 
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contrary to the Defendants' claims, the Director has no authority to reduce a 
based upon a subjective determination in order to promote "the maximum 
use and development of the state's water." Defs, Br. At 34. The court rightly 
water resources has to include the remainder of the Constitution 'in accordance with the 
appropriation doctrine."' Order at J l 7. As stated in Caldwell v. Twin Falls River Land 
& War er Co., 225 F. 584 (D.C. Idaho 19 J 5), "Economy of use is not synonymous with minimum 
use," 
Fina11y, honoring a cow.rt water right adjudication the from re-
conditioning a decreed water right on the basis of «historic when the appropriation 
'Nas first made. Once a decree has been entered, the is bound to accept the court's 
findings. 52 See Beecher, 66 Jdaho al J 0 ("When water once been decreed and becomes a 
fixed r:i ght, the ·water must be distributed as in tit e decree provided.") (emphasis added). 53 As 
52 ,The SRBA Court explained the same in the context of the Depanment's conjunctive management rules and partial 
decrees issued by that court: 
Collateral attack of the elements of a panial decree cannot be made in an administrative forui.-ri. 
As such, the Director cannot re-examine the basis for the water as a condition of 
administration by looking behind the paniaJ decree to the as they existed at the time 
the right was appropriated. This includes a re-examination existing conditions in the 
context of applying a "material injury" analysis through application ofID'V-,'R's Rules for 
Conjunctive Management of Surface and Groundwater Resources, IDAP A 37 .03 ,J l el .seq. 
R. VoL IX, p. 2322. 
51 1be district court rightiy followed this Court's which has held that a watennasrer does no: 
have the abiliry to "second-guess" court decrees iJJ adminisrration: "[i]t is contrary to law that the Director, or any 
parry to the SRBA could, fr1 effec: stipulate to the elements of a water right in one proceeding and then collaterally 
arrack the same elements when the right is iater sought to be enforced." Order at 93; see 5ra1e v, Nelson, 13 J J daho 
l 2, J 6 (1998) ("1he wate:rmaster is to distribute waler to the adjudication or decree!'); Stethem v. Skinner, 
J l Idaho 374, 379 (J 905) ("We think the position is correct .. , where the decree upon its face is explicit as to the 
stream from which the waters are to be distributed, that the water-master cannot be required 10 look beyond the 
decree itself"). 







set fonh below, the Rules \lio late the law's requirements and effecl a "re-adjudication" of senior 
water rights. 
B. The Rules Unlawfully Force Seniors to Re-Pro"e a Water Right Under the 
Guise of "Reasonableness" and "Material Injury" Determinations. 
The Defendants and JGWA downplay the significance of adjudications and t1)e binding 
effect of a decree in administration.54 JGWA sirnjlarly argues that only in administration, not 
adjudications, is a water right holder's "diversion" and potential "waste" of water determined. 
JGWA Br. at 32-34. Such arguments do not justify how the Rules unlawfully force seniors to re-
defend the elements of a decreed water right every time administration occurs. 
The Rules strip a decree's "conclusive" effect and replace it with whatever the Director 
detennines is "reasonable.''55 The Rule 40 and 42 "material injury" determinations, which are 
further conditioned by a "reasonableness" opinion, effectively preclude administration according 
to a court's decree . 56 See Nelson, J 31 Jdaho at J 6; Slefhem, i J Jdaho at 3 79 . 
~·The Deiendants continue to advance the same arguments they offered in Hogermon Water Right °'1mers. Jnc. -
even citing a footnote from Briggs):. Golden Volley Lond & Caffie Co., 97 ldaho 427, 435 (1976) to argue that a 
s::nior is nol entitled to diver. the quantity set forth on his decree. Defs. Br. at 31. Yet, Briggs does not suppor1 the 
Defendants' contention and is foreclosed by this Court's decision in Hogermon Water Righi OwnerJ, Inc. Vlhile, in 
Briggs, the Director had reduced prior licensed water rights pursuam to a prior district coun order, the question 
before the Coun concerned the perfection of the appeal and whether or not the clisoict court had authority to restrain 
the Director from allowing junior ground water right holders to pump water that had no1 been used by the seniors. 
97 Jdaho al 435. Jn reviewing the Ground Water Act and section 42-220, the Coun concluded tlle Djrector had 
authority io allow junior ground water right holders to diven from the aquifer based upon the finding that water was 
available without "mining" the aquifer. Jd. Comrary to the Depamnent's claim, the case does not S1and for tlle 
proposition that the Director is tree to disregard a senior's decreed water right for purposes of administration. S 
5~ ln the face of nearly one hundred years of stare decisis on this subject, Rule 20.05 boldly states that "[T]hese rulcs 
provide the basis for determining the reasonableness of the diversion and use of water by [] the holder of a senior-
priority water right who requests priority delivery." 
~6 The district c:ow1 acknowledged that certain "factor and policies" in the Rules "can be construed consistent with 
the prior appropriation doctrine", so long as one is "careful to evaluate the comext in which tli~y are made." Order 
at 84. Die Defendants Rules' are not so "careful'', and the conicxt in which these various "factors and policies" are 


































Notably, the "reasonableness" condition, in conjunction with the vanous Rule 42 
"material injury" factors, impem1issibJy shifts an objective "injury" inquiry away from the state 
of the water supply aod the impact of the junior's diversion on the supply to the senior and 
whether or not he can prove a "reasonable" and "efficient" diversion and use to the satisfaction 
of the Director. Accordingly, the context of "material injury" in the Rules is strikingly different 
than what consfautes "injury" under Jdaho law, or wbat is required of a junior to prove a senjor 
is "wasting" water or that a call would be "futile". 57 
Under Idaho Jaw, a reduction in the water supply available for diversion and use by a 
senior results in an "'injury" to that senior's water right. 58 The inqufry is objective and is based 
upon a review of the juruor's diversion and impact on the water source. However, the Rules 
define "material injury" as "hindrance to or impact upon the exercise of a water right caused by 
the use of water by another person as determined in accordance with Idaho law, as set fortlr in 
placed impe!Tilissibly undercuts prior decrees, thereby effecting a "re-adjudication'· of decreed water rights contrary 
to Jdaho law. 
57 At the hearing on the Defendants' motion to stay the judgment, the district court explained: 
THE COURT: ... And so what J see under the conjunctive management with this new 
body oflaw that the director wants to evolve is that there is no presumption ofinjlll)'. There's 
a different definition of injury in curtailmem that be tries to develop with this material injlll)' 
and the factors that he has enunciated; as opposed to what injury mea'l, historically, in 
curtaiiment cases. 
Tr. Vol. II, p. BO, L. JO-I 7. 
5~ See R. Vol. V, pp. 1020-22. The distrlct court, following this Court's definition of"injury" from Beecher 
correctly noted that "injury'· in the administration context "is universally understood to mean a decrease in the 
volurne or snppiy ofwarer to the detriment of the senior." Order al 77. See Beecher, J 0 ldaho at &. Diverting water 
from a supply that would otherwise be available to fill a senior right obviously "decreases the volume of waler in a 
stream" and constitutes a "real and acmal injury" to the senior. See id at 7, 8. 
The "injury" question, as expressed in the statutes concerning new water right appropriations and transfers, 
centers on the proposed action's impact, not the "reasonableness" or "efficiency" of uses under existing water rights. 
The same is true for water distribution under LC. § 42-607. The watennaster monitors the supply and curtails junior 
rights as necessary to protect senior rights from receiving Jess water than they otherwise would by reason of those 
junior diversions. See Jones v. Big losr Jrr. Dist., 93 Idaho 227, 229 (J 969) ("The duties of a water master are to 
determine decrees, regulate flow of streams B>"Jd to transfer the water of decreed rights ro the appropriate diversion 
points, LC. § 42-607 ."). 






Rule42." Rule :0.14 (emphasis added). The definitiontierstoRule42 factors for 
further explanation. 59 These Rule 42 factors coP.flicl with Idaho's water and what 
constitutes "injury" to a water right in a curtailment conte)...i.. 
Indeed. the of bow the Rule 42 factors play out in administration is telling as to 
how "injury" is not tied to a senior's water but instead is determined in the context of what 
tbe Direc:or believes is a use. In Plaintiffs' case the Director disregarded 
"injury" that was occurring to their water rights and instead created a "minimum fulj supply", or 
wbat he bel1eved was "reasonable", for administration.60 In the case of Piaintiff-Intervenor, 
Clear Springs Foods, the Director unlawfully re-conditioned Clear Springs' decreed water rights 
by limiting the decreed quantity as a "seasonal higl1" based upon what the Director believed to be 
"historic con di ti ons. "6l 
~9 The district coun rightly acknowledged how the Rules undermine the cenainty of replacir,g 
water distribution to decrees with subjective detenninations by the Director: "Jn the Director'$ effon to 
satisfy all water users on a given source, seniors are put in the position of re-defending the elem ems of their 
adjudicated water every time a can is made for water ... tbe Director is put \n the role of re-defining 
eiements of water in orderto strategize how to satisfy all water user; as opposed to objectively administering 
water riclits in accordance with the decrees." Order at 97. 
6~ In the~Plaintiffs' case the> Director failed to administer any junior ground water rights the 2005 irrigation 
season. lnstead, hydraulically connected junfor ground water rights in Water Districts 120 a.nd J 30 were allowed to 
divert unabated throughout the 2005 L'1igation season and deplete the water sources that supply the Plaintiffs' senior 
surface water rights. Whereas the natural stream and spring flows hit all-time recorded lows in 2005, junior priority 
ground water users were to freely intercep< tributary spring flows and reacli gains that would have 
otherwise been available to Plaintiffs' senior surface water rights. 
Jn examining whether or no! the Plaintiffs would be "materially injured", the Director tbeir 
previously decreed water rights, the stated quantity elements, by arbitrarily determining tha< rheir "total" 
diversions ofnamral flow and storage water in I 995 represemed tbfr "minimum full supply" entitled to ,....,,,,,..,,n,,,, 
in administration. R. Vol. l, p. 77, 1 g2 (May 2, 2005 Order at 20, 25). This "minimuJn full supply" determination 
was the ~a.sis for the Director's "material injury'' detennination. Id. at J 82 (May 2, 2005 Order al 25, ~ l l Since 
tlie Rules provide for ur:iawful ·'re-adjudications'' of vested senior water rights they create a system of water right 
administratfon that violates Jdaho's constitLttional mandate of"first in time, first in righc." 
61 In the Clear Springs case, frie Director refused to honor the decreed elements of Clear Springs' water rights, and 
instead de1ennined the quantities only signified a "maximum" authorized rate of diversion subject to re-











The lack of "objective standru·ds" fonher undermines decreed water and the 
::::>irector unlimited discretion for his "factual determinations" under the Rules. 
the statute that governs wate:- distribution, "is intended to make the authority of a waterrnaster 
more certain, his duties less difficull and his decisions less controversial." R.r Nahas 1:4 
Idaho at 27 (Ct. App. 1988). 62 The Rules defeat the statute's purpose by rep] acing 
" ' 
water right administration pursuant to decrees with unce!tain "reasonableness" decisions are 
committed to the opinion of the Director. As explained above, the "material injury" 
detennination under Rules 40 and 42 is dependant upon what the determfries is 
"reasonable", not objective criteria or the stated tenns of a decreed water right Without 
objective standards, there is nothing "to establish what is or is not reasonable." Order at 95. The 
district court correctly identified the dangers with such a system of water adrninistrati on: 
The way the CMR' s are now structured, the final arbiter 
regarding wha1 is "reasonabie" without the au1J"''·"-"·ui1 or governance of any 
express objective standards or evidentt&)' The determination essentially 
detennination based upon conditions presumed 10 have existed when Clear made its original appropriations. 
R. Vol. V, p. J 139 (July 8, 2005 Order at 12-)3, ~~ 55-56;relying upon Rule 42.0J ,a "The amount ofwater 
available in the source from which the water right is diverted. Further, the quantity element was unla\.\fully re-
conditioned to merely representing an entitlement at a spring flow "seasonal high", instead of the year-round 
diversion rate that was decreed by the SRBA Court. R. Vol. V, p. I 140 (July 8, 2005 Order. at l 4, ~ 61 ). As such, 
such, the Director administratively reduced Clear decreed water rights. Such a determination, provided by 
the Rules, contradicts the unambiguous quantity tenns of CJ ear Springs' decrees and plainly violates the 
watennaster's "clear legal duty" to distribute water to those decrees. 
Furtliennore, the Director's "material injury" analysis shows how the burden under fae Rules inevitab]y falls on a 
senior right holder. Jn the Director even refused to cunail any interfering junior ground water rights "unless 
Clear Springs e.l..1ends or imprOPes tfle col/ecrion canal . .. or unless Clear Springs demonstrates to the 
smisfaction of the Director that extending and improving the collection canal for the Cryswl Sprbigs Fann ls 
infeasible." R VoJ. V, l l 6J, J l 64-65 (July 8, 2005 Orde; at 35, ~ 35 and at 3 8·39) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the context "material injury" in the Rules plainly conD!cts w\th the "injury" definition provided by 
Jdaho Jaw a:nd is the vehicle for a "re-adjudication" of a senior'; decreed water right. 
61 See also, Jones, 93 Jdaho at 229;Nampa & Meridian )rr. Dist. 1:, Barclay, 56 Jdaho J 3, 20 (l 935) ("The defendant 
water master is only an administrath>e. office• and has no interest in rhe subject of the litigation - his only duty is to 
distribute the waters of his district i..-:1 ac:::ordance with the respective rights of appropriators"). 






























becomes one of discretion, which is inconsistem the constitutionaJ protections 
specifically afforded water rights. Tne absence of any standards or burdens also 
eliminates the possibility of any meaningful judicial review of the Director's 
action as under applicable standards ofreview, as any reviewing court wmild 
always be bound by the Director's recommendation as to what constitutes 
reasonableness. 
Order at 96. 
The end result is that th~ Rules' "reasonableness" standard leaves adjudications, like the 
SRBA, as simply water right cataloging exercises. If a ··water user cannot rely upon his decree 
for admirjstration, and is instead left with whatever is "reasonable" in t.}Je eyes of the Director, 
there is no "finality'' in the water right. Such a quandary leaves a senior guessing as to how 
much water will delivered from year to year. The dist.--ict court properly recognized tbe lack of 
"objective standards" in the Rules and how the unbounded "reasonableness" standard conflicts 
v-.~th the protections afforded senior rights under tbe constitution and water distribution statutes. 
The court's detem1ination that the Rules effect an unlav-rful "re-adjudication" of a senior's water 
right was proper. This Cou.rt should affi1m. 
VJ. Administration Under the Rules Constitutes an Unconstitutional "Taking'' of a 
Senior,s Property Right. 
The rjght to use the waters ofidaho is a constitutional right. IDAHO CONST., art XV §§ l, 
3, and 4, see Wilterding v. Green, 4 Idabo 773, 779-80 (1896). A water right also represents a 
reaJ property right. LC.§ 55-l OJ; see Nerrleton 1'. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87, 90 (1977). Priority, a 
property right interest, gives a water right its value. 63 By requjring \Vater 10 be distributed to 
6
; Tne Colorado Supreme Coun described the property aspect of a water righr's priority in Nichols v. Mclnrosh, 34 
P. 278, 280 (Colo. l 893) ("p1iorities of right to the use of water are property rights ... Propeny rights in water 
consist not alone in the amount of the appropriation, but also in the priority of the approp1iation. h ofien happens 
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tl1e constitution ai1d water distibution statutes protect a water 
is Lrue on water sources that are fully or over-appropriated. 64 Court has 
that to diminish a senior's priority by taking wate~· that would otherwise be available 
for his diversion and use, results in an "injury" to the senior's water :-Lght. See Jenkins, 103 
Idaho at 388. The Defendants' Rules unlawfully diminish a water pr:ioiity and create a 
system that ensures water is supplied to junior water rights, not seniors, first. The 
Director has no authority to take water from a senior and give it ro a junior, thereby physically 
diminishing the senior's right to use the water. See Lockwood, l 5 Jdabo at 398 ("The state 
engineer has no authority to a prior appropriator of water from any streams in this state. 
and give it to any other person. rights ca11.i.'10t thus be taken away:'). 
The district court these fundamental problems with the Ruies and rightly held 
that "the of water rights, ·which occurs as a direct result of ad.llinistration '-'"'L"'-''=' 
CMR's, a physicaJ taking." Order at 122. Moreover, tbe district court 
that "because tbe Director, through the CMR' s has t.l-ie ability to 
amount of water a senior user is entitled without establishing waste, he is ""~'"'""""4' gjven t.he 
power to alter the property right." Order at 123. 
The U1uted States Constitution, through the Clause of frie Fifth Amendment 
(applicable to the states through the Fourteenth and the Jdabo Constitution, 
expressly through Article 1 § J 4 and Article XV § 3, forbid a govemm ent agency from "taking" a 
that the chief value of an appropriat)on consists in its priority over other appropriations from the same narural 
STTeam, Hence, to deprive a person of his prioiil)' is to deprive him of a most valuable property tight." 
., See Sanderson v. Solmon River Canal Co., 34 Jdaho 303, 309 ( 192 l) ("The question of priorities becomes of 
practical importance only where 1he water supply rums out to be pennanently inadequate."). 























person's water right without "just compensation."65 Roark v. Ciry of Caldwell, 87 ldaho 557, 
561 (]964) ("It is fundamental that these constitutional provisions prohibit the taking of private 
property for public use without just compensation."); Crow, 107 Idaho at 465. 
The Defendants argue that because the concepts of "beneficial use", "waste", and "futile 
call" are limits of a water right, "state regulation" of a right pursuant to those factors does not 
constitute a "taking". Dejs. Br. al 33. The Defendants miss the point and fail to recognize that 
as a "legally protected" property right interest, a water right is not subject to arbitrary changes by 
a state agency "in the interests of the common welfare." Moreover, the claim that "water 
be] ongs to the state" does not vest the Defendants with authority to "take" water that would 
otherwise be diverted and used by a senior and distribute it to a junior right instead. 66 Yet this is 
exactly what happens under the Rules. Instead of receiving water they are lawfully entitled to 
divert and use, seniors must suffer shortages while juniors receive the benefit of countless 
"contested cases" and "reasonableness" determinations that preclude priority water distribution. 
Sucb a "common property" scheme for water distribution that results under the Rules was firmly 
rejected in Kirk v. Bartholomew, supra, 3 Idaho at 372.67 Since the Plaintiffs must go through 
the state (i.e. the watennaster) to receive water pursuant to their rights, the district court con-ectly 
found that a failure to properly distribute water to a senior effects a "physical taking" that injures 
the senior. Order at l 22. This Court should affirm. 
•l The importance of a private property interest in Idaho has been recognized by this Court. See LU. Ranching Co. 
v. United States, 13S Jdaho 606, 608 (2003) ("The private interest at stake is g.reat. The right to water is a permanent 
concern to farmers, ranchers, and other users."). 
66 But see; J.C. § 42- J l 0 ("Water diverted from its source pursuant to a water right is the property of the appropriator 
while it is lawfully divei1ed, captured, conveyed, used, or otherwise physically controlled by the appropriator."). 
67 See also, R. Vol.!\/, pp. 1007-08. 
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VII. Storage \Vater Rjghts, Storage Water and Reasonable Carryo"l•er. 
A storage water right, like any other water right in Idaho, is entitled to the same 
constitutional protections a..fforded real property ;ights. 1.C. § 55-10 l; Benneu v. Twin Falls 
North Side Land & Water Co., 27 Idaho 643. 651 ( l 915); Murray v. Public Utilities Commission, 
27 Idaho 603, 620 (1915) (if one appropriates water for a beneficial use, and then sells, rents or 
distributes it to others, he has a valuable right entitled to protection as a property right). Pursuant 
to the constitution and water distribution statutes, junior ground water rights cannot interfere 
with or take water that would otherv.'ise be available to fill a senior priority storage water right or 
•'take" the water stored under said right or rights. 
Under the provisions of Rule 42, the Director is empowered to require the use of the 
storage water of each Plaintiff to mitigate the diversions by junior priority ground water rights, 
subject to "reasonable can')1over" established by the Director, which could be zero, before 
diversjons and v,rithdrawals under junior pri?rity grotmd water rights may be reduced or 
curtailed. See Order at 111 ("reasonable carryover" for Burley and Minidoka Irrigation Districts 
detennined to be zero acre-feet in 2005). The district cour1 rightly rejected this Rule. The 
district court, in its extensive review of Rule 42.01., properly concluded that: "Absent a proper 
showing of waste, serJor storage right holders are allowed to store up 10 the quantity stated in the 
storage right, free of diminishment by the Director.',; and that "The reasonable carry-over 
provision of the CMR 's is unconstitutional, both on its face, and as threatened to be applied to 
the plaintiffs in this case." Order at 109-11 7. 
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Two obsen1ations and findings by the district coun provide significant insigh1 into this 
issue. The court stated: 
Plaintiffs' purposes in securing the storage rights are obvious--the storage water 
rights were acquired to both supplement their natural flow diversions in a current 
year necessary to cover shortages caused by naturally occuning conditions (e.g. a 
drought), and to ensure plaintiffs would ha·ve a sufficient water supply in future 
years in times of shortage caused by naturally occurring conditions. Tne 
purposes of storage was never to sen1e as a slush fund in order to allow the 
Director to spread water and avoid administering junior ground water rights in 
priority; nor was it ever intended to cover shortages caused by junior diversions. 
Order at 114. 
The Defendants argue that somehow the holding in Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water 
Co., 161 F.43, 47 (9th Cir. 1908), affd 224 U.S. 107 (l912), allows the state to consider the 
"rights of the public." The Schodde case does not stand for the principle that the use and 
carryover of storage water may be controlled by the state in c·ontravention of the storage water 
right. The issue in Schodde was the use of water for the diversion of water under an irrigation 
right, not the use of the water diverted for irrigation. Defs. Br. at 35. Tbe Defendants further 
argue that as storage rights are sometimes expressed as "supplemental rights" to primary natural 
surface flow rights, somehow the water stored may be directed by the Director to be used to 
mitigate wrongful diversions by jumor appropriators from a senior's natural sµrface water flo'"'' 
supply before administration will occur. IGWA argues that under Idaho's Constitution, 
carryover storage has no status in priority administration. These arguments seem to adopt the 
reasoning of the triaJ court in Washington County Jrr. Dist. l'. Taiboy, 55 Jdaho 382 (l 935), 
which held: 
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The court is of the oplTllon that public waters of the state, impounded in a 
reservoir, do not become either the personal propeny or private properly of the 
owners of the reservoir. Further that while there is a distinction between storage 
water and water flowing in the stream, the distinction as contended for by 
plaintiff does not eYJst. The ccw1 is of the opinion furL11er that such waters when 
impounded in a reservoir remain the public waters of the state; that the rights to 
the use of the same are usufructuary, tha1 the ownership of public waters by the 
state constitutes a trust to be administered ·so as to accompiish the greatesl benefi t 
to the people of the srate; ... 
55 Idaho at 388. This holding by the trial court was finnly rejected and the decision overturned 
by the }da.}10 Supreme Court. The Supreme Courl held.: 
After the wa1er was diverted from the natural stream and stored in the reservoir, it 
was no longer "public water" subject to diversion and appropnation under the 
provisions of the Constitution (article 15, § 3). It then became water 
"appropriated for sale, rental or distribution" in accordance with the provisions of 
sections l , 2, and 3, an. 15, of the Constitution. The water so impounded then 
beca.'"ne the property of the appropriators and owners of the reservoir, impressed 
with 1.he publ ic trust to apply to a beneficial use. 
Id a; 389. 
The Collr1 further stated: 
No one can make an appropriation from a reservoir or a canai for the obvious 
reason that the '":aters so stored or conveyed are al.ready diverted and 
appropriated and are no longer "public waters". Ra.bido v. Furey, 33 Idaho, 56, 
190 P. 73. This does not mean, however, that the reservoir or canal ov.'ner may 
waste the water or \Vithhold i1 from persons who make appJication to rent the 
same. (Cases dted) lf, on the other hand, the owner of the reservoir owns land 
subject to irrigation from such reservoir, he may apply it 10 his O'Nn land or sell it 
to others, or both, according to the priorities of their applications . 
Id. at 389-390 
Fina)jy, the Court found that the spaceholders in the resen 1oir were tenants in common, 
but one co-tenant may not draw off, use, and enjoy the full number of acre-feet to which it is 









entitled and then because it is a co-tenant, either use or sell t,'>-Je share co-1enan1 without in 
any sense responsible therefor. 
The significance and nature of water rights held by an iffigation dstric1 are clearly 
demonstrated in Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lifi Irr. Dist., 85 Idaho 528 (l 963). In that case, 
Milner Irrigation District ("Milner") annexed additional lands in 1952, on the condition that 
lands included ir. the .district 16 the J ,952 annexation. would have the first priority to water 
under the water rights acquired prior to the annexation, including storage water in P._rner:ican 
Fa!ls Reservoir, and that the annexed would share equalJy with tbe other lands in the 
district in the new storage rights to be obtained by :Milner in Palisades Reservoir on the Snake 
River. After the 1952 annexation. the landovmers whose lands were annexed in 1952 filed legaJ 
action in whlch they sought the r:ight to share equally with all other lands in the irrigation district 
in all water rights held by L'rie district under the provisions § 43-iOJO. Jda.'-io Supreme 
that an .irrigatjon district holds title to its \Vater in trust the landovmers, and 
that the stancis in the position of appropriator for distribution to the landowners ·w1ti1.in the 
district, within the meeting of Const., Art. J 5, § 1. The lando'Vlrners, to land the water has 
become by application thereon to a beneficial use, have the status and rights 
of distributees An. 15, §§4 and 5. 85 Idabo at 545. 
The CouJ"t in Bradshaw then confirmed the holding of the trial court which 
found that the ovme1·s of old lands, through and by means of the imgation 
and for many years applied to the iJTigation of their lands, valuable water rights, which had 
become appurtenant and dedicated to lands, and which were held in trust by the district 
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their use. could not thereafter, wit'riorn their consent, be deprived use of that water when 
needed. 
The Court that l.C § 43-1010 should be interpreted only so as may be 
consisten1 with the priority of water rights as recognized and protected by the provisions of t"ie 
constitution. that the OVl'Ders of the new lands were entitled to use of any 
water ovlned by the district, when the use thereof is not required for the proper irrigation of the 
oid lands, and when such use is not in v.~tt the rights previously acquired by th.e owners 
of the old lands, or when such use is not in derogation or impairment of such prior rights. The 
Court, after noting that its conclusions were in keeping with the express conditions of the 
annexation, further stated: .. Moreover, enforcement of the claimed right to compel delivery of 
water to such ]ands, would effect an invasion of the constitutional:y protected priority rights, and 
of tbe owners of the old lands, herein before (Cases cited.)" 85 Idaho at 
548. the Defendants cannot do by rule what tlie couid not do by statute. 
irrigation rights, be as the primary source of its water, rented to ot.1Iers ]a-wful purposes, 
or carried over for use in subsequent years. Order at 115. 
The Defendants and lGWA rely upon Glcrvin v. Salmon River Canal , 44 Idaho 583 
(1927), and in sc doing 
court in Talboy, supra, 55 Jdaho at frie question in Glavin was the validity of a rule 
adopted by the canal company which allowed an individual shareholder of the company to hold 
over his allotted share of sto;·ed water stored by tbe company, v.~thout iimitatjon, thereby having 











the effect the allocated share of stored water of other shareholders in years. 
The court to be invalid. The limited decision in that case does not apply as a 
general rule appropriators, and was later clarified by the Court's decision in Rayl v, 
Salmon River Canal 66 Idaho 199 (1945). 
The Defendants and 1GWA also cite Rayl to support their posi:ion that the has 
the right to determine the use and carry-over of storage, while ignoring the facts and 
, holding of the Court In Rayl, the Court was again requested to consider holdover by individual 
shareholders in the space the Carey Act corporation. The rule was being challenged, 
L'l reliance upon Glavin v. Salmon River Canal Co., supra. Jn response to this claim, the couri 
stated: 
Quite obviously the above opinion did not hold and was not intended to hold 
that irrigation organizations and/or individual appropriators of water could not 
accumulate within their appropriations and ltold storage over from one season 
to the next, both to encourage and economic use of water and to guard 
against a short run-off in seasons, because such custom has become 
too v-lell entrenched in the concept of our water law both by practice and poor 
and subsequent precept to be thus denounced and forbidden. T!te court merely 
held the particular rule offended in certain particulars. 
66 Jdaho at 201 (emphasis added), 
The Court in Rayl 'Lhen proceeded 10 review, with approval, numerous p::-actices 
illustrating the approval· of carry-over water in a reservoir storing water for irrigation. The Rayl 
Court noted that it had 011 aD earlier occasion in American Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Thrall, 39 
ldaho 105 0 924), approved a contract which 
Should there ever, in any year, be such a 
available for storage in American Falls 
' BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO 
in part, that: 
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storage, 10gether with any surplus held over i11 said reservoir from previous years, 
is insufficient to fi]J the resen1oir to full capacity. t}ien in such year any pany 
entitled 10 water from said reservoir, who shall have conserved and held over in 
said reservoir from the previous year a11y pan of tbe water which said party was 
entitled to have received during such previous year, shall be entitled to the use 
and benefit of the water so beld over by such party to the extent that such hold-
over water may be necessary to complete the filling of such pa1ty' s pro rata share 
of the reservoii capacity. 
66 Jdaho 204-205. 
The Court furJie:- noted that the contract considered and approved in Board of Directors 
v. Jorgensen, 64 Idaho 538 (194'3), recognized the rights of carry or hold-over storage while 
recognizing that when the reservoir was filled to capacity, hold-over rights are v1~ped out, 
because those who had not contributed to the hold-over water and therefore may and should not 
participate in its distribution, may nevertheless not be dep1ived of their rights to ne\v storage the 
succeeding year. The Court in Rayl, supra, then stated: "Because even if the Jaw compelled 
every reservoir to be drained dry at the end of every irrigation season, the user who needed mo:;-e 
than his allotted share could not take from the economical user, because the latter could himself 
use and exhaust his water or sell or lease part of all of it." 66 Idaho at 206. 
The Court also noted: 
There is a fundamental difference with regard to the diversion and use of water 
from a floVl~ng stream and a reservoir. In a stream if a user does not take out his 
water, it may be diverted by the other appropriators, because otherwise it flows 
on and is dissipated. But the very purpose of storage is to retain and hold for 
subsequent use, direct or augmentary, hence retention is no1 of itself illegal nor 
does it deprive the user of the right to continue to hold. 
Jd. at 208: 
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Finally, the Court stated: 
If the settler's right is barely sufficient for his needs in the ordinary years and 
in the absence of mishaps, manifestly he must suffer Joss when the rnn-off falls 
below the average, or when, through accidents to the system, there is pm1ial or 
temporary Joss of the use of water, or when, because of light precipitation and 
other weather conditions, the need of water is unusually large. Ordinaiily for 
the famier not to make provision against such contingencies ·would be counted 
against him for carelessness. So far as I am aware, it has never been heid or 
contended that in making an appropriation of water from a natural stream the 
appropriator is limited in the right he can acquire to his minimum needs, and 
no reason is apparent why one who contracts to receive water from another 
should be limited to such needs. Consen1ation of water is a wise public policy, 
but so a1so is the conservation of the energy and well-being of him who uses it. 
Economy of use is not synonymous with minimum use. Caldwell v. Twin 
Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., D.CJdabo, 225 F. 584, at pages 595, 
596. 
66 Idaho 210- J J (emphasis added). 
Another significant benefit derived from carry-over of stored water that has not been 
mentioned by the courts is the significant improvement in tbe capacity of reservoirs with the 
most junior water right to refill eacb year. To the extent there is hold-over in ai'1y reservoir, there 
is Jess water .required from the river system to fill all available capacity in ali resen.1oirs. Neither 
the Department's Rules nor any other rule of law should allov,r the Director to determine tbe 
extent to which stored water must be used and carry-over reduced before administration v"ill be 
allowed against a junior ground water appropriator, as it injures the rights of all entities that have 
contracted for and obtained a r:ight to store water to insure an adequate water supply for the lands 
served by that entity. 
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A senior's siored water does not, as argued by the IGWA and the Defendants, have to be 
applied 10 the senior's land to be put lO beneficial use. 68 Jt is undisputed that stored water in 
Idaho is routinely rented through the Idaho State Water Supply Bank and its local renta] pools, 
including the Water District OJ rental pool. J.C. §§ 42-1761 through 1765 ("board may appoint 
local committees ... to facilitate the rental of stored water."). 69 A senior's ability to rent his 
storage water to others, including to the United States Bureau of Reclamation for salmon 
migration purposes, has been expressly approved by the Idaho Legislature, and does not 
constitute "waste" or "non-use". 70 LC. §§ 42-l 763B. 1764. Since the State of Idaho does not 
own storage water, senior water right holders like Plaintiffs are the ones left to rent water to the 
U.S. Bureau ofRecla.1J1ation to fulfill the SRBA Nez Perce Water Rjghts Agreement. 71 
Once decreed or licensed, tbe Director has no authority to alter or change a storage water 
right through administration. See Nelson, 13 J Jdaho at 16 ("Finality in water ;ights is essential. . 
6
' The Defendant' recognized the same at the hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment: 
THE COURT: ls the storage itself, the water while it's in the storage, to be used for 
irrigation? Js that a beneficial use? The storage of water itself. 
MR. RASSIER: J think it's generally viewed as a beneficial use. lf)•ou need to have a 
beneficial use in ordec to divert the water from the - from the natural source, that is the beneficial 
use. Storage for some subsequent use - Or J guess in some instances, there may be storage for 
aesthetic use, in-place use, yes. 
Tr. Vol. J, p. 267 L, 20-25; p. 268, L. J-5. 
69 JGWA has participated in "renting" stored water through the Water District OJ local rental pool. R Vol. 1, p. 46 
("JGWA has submined executed lease agreements with Peoples Irrigation Company, rhe Idaho lnigation District, 
and the New Sweden lrriga~ion District that lease a total of20,000 acre-fret ofstora,ee water."). Although JGWA 
argues that such water has "no status in priority administration" because it was not lJ?Mlby the lessors, it at the same 
time has no problem using !he rental ban'.k system and the priority afforded that storage water to try and avoid 
administration of th~ junior priority ground water rights held by its members. The hypocrisy of JGWA 's argumem~ 
and actions is evident. Apparently only the Plaintiffs, who seek to prevent unlawful interference by junior priority 
ground water rights, nave no right to re;it their storage water to others. 
70 Pocatello, a spaceholder witb storage water in Palisades reservoir, but without any diversion works to take that 
water from the Snake River, would pres·umably agree t'iat a "rental" of storage water constitutes a beneficial use 
since it has never diverted its storage water and used it for irrigation purposes. Pocatello fails \o explain how non-
use and rental of irs stored waler is beneficial but if Plaintiffs carryover and rent t.'ieir storage water it is ''waste". 
71 See discussion ar R. Vol. IX, p. 2272-73. 
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.. An agreement to charige ai1y of the definitional factors of a water would be comparable 
to a change in the description of the property."); Cww, l 07 Jdaho at 465 Moreover, the Director 
cannot take water that \vould have been stored under a right and give it to a jun.ior instead. 
Loclcwood, J 5 Idaho at 398. Despite this rule, the carryover" provision takes the use 
of a senior's storage right in violation ofldaho's constitution and water distrib~tion statutes. 
First, the Rule impem1issibly allows the to the stated amounts of a 
senior's storage water right. Rule 42.0 l .g. provides, in essence, that notwithstanding the fa::~ that 
L'rie water supply available u.11der a senior-priority water right has been substantially affected by 
diversions under a junior-priority water 
and use of water in accordance with tbe of the rights so long a~ the senior has enough 
storage water to mitigate the water supply caused by a junior ground water diverter, 
over and above a reasonable amount of carry-over storage as detennined by the Director. The 
Rule allows the Director to avoid administering junior ground water rights in priority if a senfor 
is able to carryover an amount water t11at tlle Director deems to be "reasonable", regard!ess of 
the a.mounts the senior is entitled to carryover pursuant to his storage water rigbt. 
Jf these were to vahd on their face, one must ac:::ept the premise that the 
Director could the same standards and could consider the same fa:::tors in determining 
water The junior right hoJder c01lld argue, under !'lis equaJ protection rights, tha.1 
his from the stream in times of sh011age should not be curtailed so Jong as the holder of 
stored water to meet its required v.iater supply. 
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It is clear tha1 Rules 40 and 42 provide for the destr'Jction, inte:::ruption or of 
common, usual and ordinary i:se of stored water. That the stored water and the water 
such diversion of water for storage are property rights held by Plaintiffs, and such 
rules a:·e unlav.ful and unconstitutional and orovide for the one's property without just 
compensation, in contravention of Article J, §§ 13 and 1 4 of the Idaho Constitution. The distric.i 
court rightly declared the RuJes u..11constitutional. should 
ATTORNEYS' 
If the Plaintiffs prevail on appeal they costs and attorneys' fees as provided by 
Appellate Rules 40 and 41 and ldaho Code 12-1)7. Plaintiffs, as senior water right 
Defendants should never made. Fischer v. Ciry of Ker chum, i 41 Jdaho 349, 356 (2005). 
The Defendants no reasonable basis in fact or law to appeal a decision striking rules thar 
were in excess of statutory authority and that plainly contradict Jdaho' s 
and water statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
Idaho Constitution a.rid state's water distribution statutes senior water rights 
protection against interfering junior rights. In times shortage a or is entitled to water 
the burden to show the 
senior's diversion and use is "waste", not regulation of the junjor wouid 
be "futile". The Department's Ruies extinguish constitutional protections for seniors, result 
in a taking of private property rights, and timely water distribution ·with endless 
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administrative "contested cases". Tbe Rules fwiher render water rights, including 
obsolete by leaving the determination of bow much water a righ1 holder is emit led 
The distric1 court properly declared the Rules unconstitutional. Cour1 should affim1. 
Dated this 101h day of November, 2006. 
LING ROBINSON & 
~d~ 
~erD.Ling 
A11 orneys for A & B Irrigation Dis trier and 
Burley Jnigarion Districr 
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PLAINTIFFS' BRJEF IN RESPONSE TO 
ARKOOSH LAW OFFl CES CHTD. 
Attorneys for American Falls Reservoir 
Districr #2 
John K Simpson 
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Clear Springs Foods, Inc. 
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Roger D. 8 
LING ROBINSON & WALKER 
P.O. 
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Arrorneys for A lrrigat!on Disrrict 
and Burley Jn·igation Distirct 
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